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PART VII, CHAPTER 1: THE DERIVATIVE ACTION

Nothing in The American Law Institute's. . . Principlesof Corporate
Governance:Analysis and Recommendations... proved more controversial than the effort to develop fair and balanced standards for the
derivative action. Only the topic of corporate takeovers seems to evoke
an equally intense level of emotion among corporate lawyers. Not
surprisingly then, Part VII (Remedies) of the Principles attracted the
same attention from critics that a lightning rod does in a thunderstorm.'

Indeed, the lobbying and scrutiny visited upon the American Law
Institute's ("ALI") work on the derivative action from the various interest
groups and academic critics rose to a level normally reserved for
congressional legislation. This remedy occupies more than half of
Volume 2 of the two volume set of the ALI Principles of Corporate
2 much of this space
Governance ("Principles");
is devoted to explanations
of carefully compromised text.
By stark contrast, the Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.")
devotes only nine sections directly to the remedy,3 one of which contains
definitions 4 and one of which applies only to foreign corporations.5
In reviewing the relevant provisions of the ALI Principlesand those
of the Georgia Code, it is important to bear in mind that, although they
may differ in detail, both utilize the same fundamental mechanisms to
constrain derivative litigation:
1) both recognize a central role for the board of directors in
derivative litigation by positioning the board so that its evaluation
of the action is given significant legal effect; and 2) both purport to
establish an expeditious means for screening and dismissing
nonmeritorious litigation.6

1. John C. Coffee Jr., New Myths and Old Realities: The American Law Institute Faces
the DeriuativeAction, 48 BUS. LAWYER 1407 (1993).
2. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOvERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1994)
[hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES].
3. O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-740 to -747, -831 (1994).
4. Id. § 14-2-740.
5. Id. § 14-2-747.

6. See ALI PRINCIPLES, IntroductoryNote to Part VII, supra note 2; O.C.G.A. § 14-2-744
(1994).
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Direct and DerivativeActions Distinguished
First, the ALI Principles, in section 7.01, distinguish between
derivative actions and direct actions. The crux of the distinction is, of
course, the party that is primarily injured. Section 7.01(a) provides
that:

A.

A derivative action may be brought in the name or right of a corporation by a holder ....

as provided in [section] 7.02 .... to redress an

injury sustained by, or enforce a duty owed to, a corporation. An
action in which the holder can prevail only by showing an injury or
breach of duty to the corporation should be treated as a derivative
action.7
On the other hand,
[a] direct action may be brought in the name and right of a holder to
redress an injury sustained by, or enforce a duty owed to, the holder.
An action in which the holder can prevail without showing an injury
or breach of duty to the corporation should be treated as a direct action
that may be maintained by the holder in an individual capacity.8
Comment c to section 7.01 provides a nonexhaustive list of actions that
most courts consider to be direct actions,' and comment d describes the
relevant criteria to be taken into account when borderline cases are
presented to the court. 10 The comments conclude by stating that courts
are more permissive in allowing the plaintiff to characterize the action
as a direct one when the plaintiff is seeking only injunctive or prospective relief, "because typically the requested relief will not involve
significant financial damages against corporate officials, the period in
which the corporation is exposed to multiple suits will be relatively brief,
and the relief will benefit all shareholders proportionately.""
Section 7.01(c) allows a shareholder to commence and maintain direct
and derivative actions simultaneously, and provides that special defenses
7. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 7.01(a).
8. Id. § 7.01(b).
9. Id. § 7.01 cmt. c. These include, for example, actions to enforce a right to vote, to
prevent the improper dilution of voting rights, to enjoin the improper voting of shares, to
compel or protect dividends, to prevent the oppression of, or fraud against, minority
shareholders, or to require the holding of shareholder's meetings. Id.
10. Id. § 7.01 cmt. d. For example, the more broadly the remedy is distributed, the
more likely it is that the remedy is derivative; once a derivative action is concluded, it will
have a preclusive effect, sparing the corporation and individuals from multiple suits; a
derivative plaintiff is usually entitled to attorney fees; and characterizing a suit as
derivative may allow the board to take over the conduct of the action, Id.
11. Id.
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or restrictions pertaining to the maintenance, settlement, or dismissal
of one action should be regarded as inapplicable to the other.'2
Section 7.01(d) specifically addresses cases in which a closely held
corporation is a party. This section gives the court discretion to treat
derivative claims as direct actions, provided that doing so will not "(i)
unfairly expose the corporation or the defendants to a multiplicity of
actions, (ii) materially prejudice the interests of creditors of the
corporation, or (iii) interfere with a fair distribution of the recovery
among all interested persons.""
A "derivative proceeding" is defined in section 14-2-740(1) of the
Georgia Code as "a civil suit in the right of a domestic corporation or, to
the extent provided in Code Section 14-2-747, in the right of a foreign
corporation." 4 The essential element of the definition is that the suit
be "in the right of the corporation." This maintains the distinction
observed in the ALI Principles between actions for the benefit of the
corporation and actions for the benefit of the shareholder individually,
which cannot be pursued derivatively. 5 The ALI Principles do not
address the issue of foreign corporations in its definition.
The Georgia Code allows a shareholder to bring a derivative suit for
the following relief:
(1)To compel the defendant to account for official conduct or to decree
any other relief called for by his official conduct in the following cases:
(A) The neglect of, failure to perform, or other violation of his
duties in the management of the corporation or in the disposition
of corporate assets;
(B) The acquisition, transfer to others, loss, or waste of corporate
assets due to any neglect of, failure to perform, or other violation
of duties; or
(C) The appropriation, in violation of his duties, of any business
opportunity of the corporation;
(2) To enjoin a proposed unlawful conveyance, assignment, or transfer
of corporate assets or other unlawful transaction where there is
sufficient evidence that it will be made; and
12. Id. § 7.01(c).
13. Id. § 7.01(d).
14. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-740 (1994).
15. See Hacienda Corp. v. White, 280 Ga. App. 879, 880, 400 S.E.2d 323, 325 (1991),
in which the court held that a shareholder could not bring a derivative action to set aside
a deed conveying all of the corporation's assets on the basis that the requisite notice was
not given to minority shareholders. The court held the statute requiring the notice to be
for the benefit and protection of minority shareholders, not the corporation, hence there
was no basis for asserting the corporation's rights derivatively. Id.
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(3) To set aside an unlawful conveyance, assignment, or transfer of
corporate assets where the transferee knew of its unlawfulness and is
made a party to the action."6
The Georgia Code does not specifically address the issues of simultaneous direct and derivative suits by a holder, or special treatment for
cases involving closely held corporations. Case law, however, has filled
the gap. The Georgia Court of Appeals has held that, in cases involving
closely held corporations, an exception exists to the general rule that
only a derivative action may be used to seek redress of corporate
injuries. 7 It has also held that shareholders have a right to bring
direct and derivative actions simultaneously. 8
B.

Standing to Commence and Maintain a Derivative Action

Section 7.02(a) of the ALI Principlesprovides that an equity security
holder has standing to commence and maintain a derivative action if the
holder:
(1) Acquired the equity security either (A) before the material facts
relating to the alleged wrong were publicly disclosed or were known by,
or specifically communicated to, the holder, or (B) by devolution of law
...from a prior holder who acquired the security as described in the
preceding clause (A);
(2) Continues to hold the equity security until the time of judgment,
unless the failure to do so is the result of corporate action in which the
holder did not acquiesce, and either (A) the derivative action was
commenced prior to the corporate action terminating the holder's
status, or (B) the court finds that the holder is better able to represent
the interests of the shareholders than any other holder who has
brought suit;
(3) Has complied with the demand requirement of section 7.03...; and
(4) Is able to represent fairly and adequately the interests of the
shareholders."
The comment to section 7.02 notes that this approach departs from
that of the majority of states because the Principles permit the court to
use the date of disclosure, rather than that of the actual consummation
of the wrong, in determining the standing of a shareholder/plaintiff

16. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-831 (1994).
17. Caswell v. Jordan, 184 Ga. App. 755, 758, 362 S.E.2d 769, 773 (1987).
18. C & S Land Dev. Corp. v. Yarbrough, 153 Ga. App. 644, 648, 266 S.E.2d 508, 511
(1980). See generally Wade H. Watson III & J. Bertram Levy, The Development of the
Shareholder'sDirectAction Damage Remedy, 28 GA. ST. B.J. 195 (1992).
19. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 7.02(a).
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under the contemporaneous ownership doctrine. 20 The comment to
section 7.02 also states that subsection (2) departs from the majority
approach by allowing two limited exceptions to the continuing ownership
rule. 21 The latter requirement in subsection (4) recognizes and seeks
to address the potential abuses that attend the necessary, and sometimes involuntary, trust the shareholders must place in the derivative
plaintiff.2
The factors considered in determining whether the plaintiff can
adequately represent the interests of the shareholders are: "(i) the
existence of any conflict of interest . . ., (ii) the competence of the

attorney representing the plaintiff, and (iii) any other evidence
suggesting that the action will not be prosecuted vigorously." ' To
augment these provisions, section 7.02(b) permits intervention by a
holder where that person's interests are not already fairly and adequately represented.
Here the Principles are consistent with the majority
24
rule,
Section 7.02(c) addresses the issue of whether a director of a corporation has standing to commence and maintain a derivative action. The
Principlesaccord standing to such persons, subject to the same fair and
adequate representation standard applied to other shareholders seeking
to bring a derivative action.2 5
The Georgia Code is very brief in its elucidation of standing requirements. O.C.G.A. section 14-2-741 provides that
[a] shareholder may not commence or maintain a derivative proceeding
unless the shareholder:
(1)Was a shareholder of the corporation at the time of the act or
omission complained of or became a shareholder through transfer
by operation of law from one who was a shareholder at that time;
and
(2) Fairly and adequately represents the interests of the corporation in enforcing the right of the corporation."
Hence, Georgia follows the majority rule of "contemporaneous ownership," that is, the plaintiff must have been an owner of the shares at the
time of the transaction in question. 7 As noted, the ALI Principlesdo

20. Id. § 7.02 cmt. a.
21.

Id.

22. Id. § 7.02 cmt. e.
23. Id.
24. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 7.02(a)(4).
25. Id. § 7.02(c).

26. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-741 (1994).
27. See id.
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not require ownership at the time of the wrong, but rather ownership
before knowledge of the material facts relating to the alleged wrong were
known by the holder."
The Georgia Code does not specifically mention "continuous ownership
until time ofjudgment" as do the ALI Principles,but it does address this
issue in another way. The use of the phrase "commence and maintain"
in the introductory clause, coupled with the requirement that the
plaintiff "fairly and adequately represent" the interest of the corporation,
effectively mandates ownership from commencement and through the
entirety of the suit.2 9 Finally, the Georgia Code does not allow for the
3°
exceptions that are provided in the ALI Principles.
Both the Georgia Code and the ALI Principles mandate "fair and
adequate representation" by the plaintiff, but they differ as to whose
interests are being represented: the Georgia Code specifies the interests
of the corporation, 3' but the ALI Principlesspecify the interests of the
shareholder.32 The comment to O.C.G.A. section 14-2-741 makes it
clear that the choice of "corporation" was deliberate, because this "more
properly reflects the nature of the derivative suit."' The language of
the ALI Principlesis derived from Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, "reflect[ing] a recognition that a derivative action is ... a
representative action and is subject to many of the same abuses ... as
are class actions."34 The focus of the concern is on representation of the
shareholders as a class, rather than on the corporation.
Although the Georgia Code does not specifically address shareholder
intervention, the comment states that "courts have in a number of
instances provided an opportunity for ...

interven[tion]" by other

shareholders if a plaintiff no longer has standing under the rules.3 5
The Georgia Code does not address director standing in a derivative
proceeding.
C. Exhaustion of IntracorporateRemedies: The Demand Rule
Section 7.03(a) states that, prior to having standing to sue derivatively, "a holder or a director [is] required to make a written demand
upon the board of directors of the corporation, requesting it to prosecute

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See supra note 20.
See O.C.G.A. § 14-2-741 cmt.
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 7.02(a)(2).
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-741(2).
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 7.02(a)(4).
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-741 cmt.
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 7.02, cmt. e.
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-741 cmt.
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the action or take suitable corrective measures."6 The only exception
applies if demand is excused under section 7.03(b). 7 Demand on the
shareholders, however, is not required.3"
This demand requirement serves several distinct purposes. First, it
prevents the court from hearing a case that is not yet ripe or which may
be rendered moot by subsequent board action. 9 Second, it gives the
board an opportunity to correct the impending problem by appropriate
action.4 ° Third, it gives the corporation the option of taking over the
suit. Finally, it gives the corporation an opportunity to reject the
demanded
action and, if necessary, seek early dismissal of the plaintiff's
41
suit.

Section 7.03(b) excuses demand only if the plaintiff can specifically
show that irreparable injury to the corporation would otherwise
result.42 In such a case, the demand must still be made promptly after
commencement of the action.43
The requirement of universal demand and the elimination of the
futility exception, along with "the substitution of a narrower 'irreparable
injury' exception," are justified on the following grounds: (i) the
irreparable injury exception will eliminate much of the threshold
litigation that slows the remedy and makes it more costly; (ii) the
demand is a relatively cheap and easy step that places little burden on
the plaintiff; (iii) elimination of the futility exception allows a clearer
standard for judicial review of a board's motion to dismiss the derivative
litigation; and (iv) it will, to some extent, cure the problem of judges
expanding the futility exception in order to rule on the merits of the
case."
The board is granted a reasonable time to respond to the demand,
during which the plaintiff cannot commence proceedings. 45 Thus, the
board need not simply capitulate to the plaintiff's demands or stoically

36. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 7.03(a)-

37. Id.
38. Id. § 7.03(c). This is consistent with the Model Business Corporations Act.
"As a general rule, informed collective shareholder consideration of proposed
As a body, the shareholders cannot realistically
litigation is not feasible.
discuss or evaluate the often complex factual and legal issues raised by
derivative actions in the same collegial manner as the board." Id. § 7.03 cmt. h.
39. Id. § 7.03 cmt. c.
40. Id.
41. Id. § 7.03.
42. Id. § 7.03(b).
43. Id.
44. Id. § 7.03 cmt. e.
45. Id.
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refuse at this stage. It can pilot a middle course and respond by taking
the matter under review. Absent irreparable injury, the plaintiff should
not be able to commence suit at this stage.46 However, once a reasonable time elapses without decision, the plaintiff's hands are untied.
No attempt is made to quantify what is a reasonable time, and bearing
in mind the innumerable factual variations that drive derivative suits,
such an attempt would probably be doomed to failure in any event. The
comments to section 7.03 do note, however, that the board should seldom
need
more than sixty days to complete its review and respond definitive47
ly.

The ALI regards dismissal without prejudice, rather than leave to
replead or dismissal with prejudice, as the most appropriate judicial
response to an unexcused failure to make demand.'
The Georgia Code, section 14-2-742 reads:
A shareholder may not commence a derivative proceeding until:
(1)A written demand has been made upon the corporation to take
suitable action; and
(2) Ninety days have expired from the date the demand was made
unless the shareholder has earlier been notified that the demand
has been rejected by the corporation or unless irreparable injury
to the corporation would result by waiting for the expiration of the
90 day period.49
Hence, Georgia has chosen a set period of time rather than the less
certain "reasonable time" favored by the ALL. Under O.C.G.A. section
14-2-743, the court may extend this ninety-day period if the corporation
has commenced an inquiry into the allegations and requests more time
to complete it."0 The comment to the section states that "it is expected
that the court will monitor the course of the investigation to ensure that
it is proceeding expeditiously and in good faith."5 Similar considerations would probably be relevant to the question of what is a "reasonable time" under the ALI Principles.
The Georgia Code thus differs from the ALI Principles by requiring
that demand be made upon the corporation, whereas, under the ALI
Principles,demand is made upon the board of directors. The reasoning
behind the requirement of making demand on the corporation, as
opposed to the board, is that there may be instances in which the taking

46. Id. § 7.03(d).
47. Id. § 7.03 cmt. f.
48. Id. § 7.03 cmt. g.

49. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-742 (1994).
50. Id. § 14-2-743.
51. Id. § 14-2-743 cmt.
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of, or refusal to take, action would fall within the authority of an officer
of the corporation, such as a decision to sue a third party for an injury
to the corporation.52
Although both the Georgia Code and the ALI Principles require a
showing of irreparable injury, such a showing under the Principles will
excuse service of the demand until after the suit is commenced. Under
the Georgia Code, it will simply expedite the ninety-day period; the
initial demand still has to be served.5"
Section 14-2-743 of the Georgia Code adds another dimension to the
period following the initial demand. It provides that, if the corporation
commences an inquiry into the plaintiff's demand or complaint, the court
may stay any derivative proceeding for as long as the court deems
appropriate. The comment to the section notes that the
4 court should
monitor any inquiry so commenced by the corporation.1
Neither the Principlesnor the Code directly addresses the content of
the demand, but the comment to O.C.G.A. section 14-2-742 says that it
should "set forth the facts concerning share ownership and be sufficiently specific to apprise the corporation of the action so that the demand
can be investigated."5
D. Action Following the Board's Rejection of the Plaintiff's Demand
Sensitive to the corporate sector's robust suspicion of derivative
plaintiffs, the ALI imposed pleading rules on the derivative plaintiff's
complaint. These rules are clearly designed to winnow out meritless
claims at the summary judgment stage.
Section 7.04 requires the detailed pleading of facts that, if true, raise a
significant prospect that the transaction or conduct complained of
breached the duty of care, duty of fair dealing, or duties that arise in
transactions in control or tender offers."; This section is meant to
impose a higher standard of pleading on the derivative plaintiff than the
"notice pleading" provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 7
If, following the board's rejection of the plaintiff's demand, the board
delivers a written reply to the plaintiff stating that the demand was
rejected by disinterested directors, that those directors constituted a
majority of the board and were "capable of objective judgment in the
circumstances," and that the reply has facts supporting these assertions

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

See id § 14-2-742 cmt.
Id. § 14-2-742.
Id. § 14-2-743 cmt.
Id. § 14-2-742 cmt.
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 7.04(a)(1).

57. Id. § 7.04 cmt. c.
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by the board, then the plaintiff must also "plead with particularity facts
that, if true, raise a significant prospect that" one of the following
conditions exists: "(A) The statements in the reply are not correct;""8 (B)
If the conduct in question has the benefit of the business judgment rule,
that the rejection of the plaintiff's demand did not satisfy the requirements of that rule;5' or (C) If the conduct in question does not have the
benefit of that rule, either (i) the rejecting directors did not satisfy the
good faith and information requirements of the business judgment rule,
or (ii) the rejecting directors could not reasonably have determined that
rejection of the demand was in the best interests of the corporation. 0
If these additional pleading requirements are not met, the defendants
are entitled to dismissal prior to discovery"1 The section is selfpolicing, with 7.04(b) requiring a Rule 11 type certification by the
derivative plaintiff's attorney, and section 7.04(d) allowing an award of
costs where the derivative action was taken in bad faith or without
reasonable cause.
On their face, subsections 7.04(b) and (d) apply to both the derivative
plaintiffs and defendants and their respective counsels; however, the
sections' main prey was clearly intended to be the original complaint.6 2
Under section 7.04(b), all attorneys of record must sign every paper
filed on behalf of their client, and in so doing, they certify that:
i) to the best of the attorney's knowledge, information, and belief,
formed after reasonable inquiry, the ... paper is well grounded in fact
and is warranted by existing law or by a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and (ii) the ...
paper is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or
to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.63

58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. § 7.04(aX2)(A).
Id. § 7.04(aX2)(B).
Id. § 7.04(a)(2)(C).
Id.

62.

ALI PRINCIPLES § 7.04 cmt. e states that

§ 7.04(b) should not be read as a general endorsement of... Rule [11], or of the
more liberal use of sanctions, but rather as a context-specific judgment that the
special nature of the derivative litigation and the broad ability it confers on the
individual shareholder to commence suit justifies authorizing courts to require
such a certification, and also to award sanctions for a failure to comply with its
standard, even if this power is not generally possessed by courts within the
jurisdiction. It should be emphasized that § 7.04 (b) is two-sided and equally
applies to counsel for the defendants.
ALI PRINCIPLES § 7.04 cmt. e.
63. Id. § 7.04(b).
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Taken directly from Rule 11,64 this section is meant to invoke the
objective standard of reasonableness applied by the Supreme Court of
the United States in Business Guides v. Chromatic Communications
M As such, a showing of bad faith on the part of the filing
Enterprises."
party or their attorney is not necessary to invoke the sanctions provided
in section 7.04(d).'
The Georgia Code does not appear to evidence as much suspicion of
derivative claims as do the ALI Principles. No heightened pleading rules
are imposed across the board on Georgia derivative proceedings. The
Georgia Code does, however, contain a costs sanction; section 14-2-746
allows the court to order the derivative plaintiff to "pay any defendant's
reasonable expenses (including attorneys' fees) incurred in defending the
proceeding if it finds that the proceeding was commenced or maintained
without reasonable cause or for an improper purpose. 6 7
E.

Board Authority in DerivativeActions
Following the filing of the plaintiff's derivative action, the board of
directors still has a role, albeit a limited one, in the conduct of the
action. Section 7.05(a) lists a series of powers vested in the board of
directors after the action is filed. The board may:
(1) Move to dismiss the action on account of the plaintiff's lack of
standing, [for failure to serve the requisite demand on the board, or
inadequate pleading], or move for dismissal of the complaint or for
summary judgment;
(2) Move for a stay of the action, including discovery, as provided by
[section] 7.06...;
(3) Move to dismiss the action as contrary to the best interest of the
corporation, as provided in [sections] 7.07-7.12...;
(4) Oppose injunctive or other relief materially affecting the corporation's interests;
(5) Adopt or pursue the action in the corporation's right;
(6) Comment on, object to, or recommend any proposed settlement,
discontinuance, compromise, or voluntary dismissal by agreement
between the plaintiff and any defendant under [section] 7.14 ....

any award of attorney fees and other expenses under [section] 7.17...
and

64.
65.
66.
67.

See id. § 7.04 cmt. e.
498 U.S. 533 (1991).
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 7.04 cmt. e.
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-746(2) (1994).

or
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(7) Seek to settle the action without agreement of the plaintiff under
[section] 7.15 .... 68

Apart from these enumerated powers, "the corporation may not
otherwise defend the action in the place of, or raise defenses on behalf

of, other defendants."69 However, the board may delegate its authority
to take any of these actions to a committee of directors, or may "[r]equest
the court to appoint a special panel in lieu of a committee of directors,
or a special member of a committee, under [section] 7.12. "70
Comment c to section 7.05 articulates the rationale for these powers:
It is axiomatic that the corporation may take over a derivative action
and pursue the action itself. An original purpose of the demand rule
was to provide an opportunity for the corporation to do so. This right
is not, however, absolute, and the court may reject the corporation's
application when it finds that those controlling or representing the
corporation in the action could not provide "fair and adequate representation" for the other shareholders. See [section] 7.02(a)(4). In addition,
any settlement between the corporation and the defendants is subject
to the standards of [section] 7.15. Finally, even when the corporation
displaces the original plaintiff, the plaintiff's attorney should be
entitled to remain in the litigation with the same status as an
intervenor and may be entitled to an award of attorneys' fees under
[section] 7.17....
Section 7.06 grants the court a broad authority to stay a derivative
action. It provides:
In the absence of special circumstances, the court should stay
discovery and all further proceedings by the plaintiff in a derivative
action on the motion of the corporation and upon such conditions as the
court deems appropriate pending the court's determination of [the
corporation's motion] under [section] 7.04(a)(2) and the completion,
within a reasonable period of any review and evaluation undertaken
and diligently pursued pursuant to [section] 7.09 .... [Tihe court may
stay discovery and further proceedings pending (a) the resolution of a
related action or (b) such other event or development as the interests
of justice may require. 71
This section follows the common practice in derivative litigation, which
is to stay discovery by the plaintiff pending the board's preparation and

68. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 7.05(a).
69. Id. § 7.05(a).
70. Id. § 7.05(b).
71. Id. § 7.05 cmt. c (citations omitted).

72. Id. § 7.06.
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submission to the'court of a report evaluating the action and its impact
on the corporation.73
Comment c to section 7.06 notes that, although it is usually appropriate for the court to postpone the action until it is determined that the
action should not be dismissed or otherwise terminated, there is a
danger in this procedure because it can serve to sidetrack derivative
litigation for a long period of time. 4 Hence, heightened judicial
scrutiny of the corporation's actions is appropriate: "When the
corporation has earlier made an unsuccessful motion to dismiss under
[section] 7.04(a)(2) and then determines to conduct a more extended
inquiry under [section] 7.09, close judicial supervision is particularly
appropriate to ensure that unnecessary delay does not occur." "
Section 7.07 provides that the court should dismiss a derivative action
on a motion by the board requesting dismissal as in the best interest of
the corporation if any of the following three conditions are met:
(1) In the case of an action against a person other than a director,
senior executive, or person in control of the corporation, or an associate
of any such person, the determinations of the board or committee
underlying the motion satisfy the requirements of the business
judgment rule...;
(2) In the case of an action against a director, senior executive, or
person in control of the corporation, or an associate of any such person,
the conditions specified in [section] 7.08 [see below] are satisfied; or
(3) In any case, the shareholders approve a resolution requesting
dismissal of the action in the manner provided in [section] 7.11 [see
below].78
These are not the only options available to the board. "Regardless of
whether a corporation chooses to proceed under (section] 7.08 or [section]
7.11, it is free to make any other motion available to it under the law,
a motion to dismiss the complaint or for summary judgincluding
77
ment."

Section 7.07(a)(1) reiterates the almost universal rule: where the
action is against a person who is neither a director, senior executive, nor
controlling person of the corporation or an associate of any of them, the
board's authority to dismiss is governed by the business judgment

73. Id. § 7.06 cmt. c.
74. Id. (citing Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501 (Del. Ch. 1984), aff'd, 499 A.2d 1184 (Del.
1985)).

75. Id. § 7.06 cmt. c.
76. Id. § 7.07(a) (citations omitted).
77. Id. § 7.07(b).
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rule.7" In contrast, where the action is against one of these parties, the
heightened scrutiny of sections 7.08 to 7.10 is brought into play.79
Section 7.08 provides:
The court should, subject to [a determination of whether the
defendant obtained a significant improper benefit] dismiss a derivative
action against a defendant who is a director, a senior executive, or a
person in control of the corporation, or an associate of any such person,
if:

a. The board.., has determined that the action is contrary to the
best interests of the corporation and has requested dismissal of
the action;
b. The procedures specified in [section] 7.09 ... for the conduct

of a review and evaluation of the action were substantially
complied with . .

. ,

or any material departures therefrom were

justified under the circumstances; and
c. The determinations of the board or committee satisfy the
applicable standard of review set forth in [section] 7.10(a).80
This section is meant to outline "an integrated framework for judicial
review" of a board's decision to seek dismissal of a derivative action.'
It "comes into play when a derivative action is not dismissed under
[section] 7.04(a), either because the corporation did not make a motion
under that section or because the court declined to grant the motion." 2
The procedural standards to be applied by the board to the review and
evaluation of a derivative action against directors, senior executives,
controlling persons, or associates thereof (and to section 7.11 dismissals),
are contained in section 7.09(a). These standards are:
(1) The board or committee should be composed of two or more persons,
no participating member of which was interested in the action, and
should as a group be capable of objective judgment in the circumstances;
(2) The board or committee should be assisted by counsel of its choice
and such other agents as it reasonably considers necessary;
(3) The determinations of the board or committee should be based upon
a review and evaluation that was sufficiently informed to satisfy the
standards applicable under [section] 7.10(a); and
(4) If the board or committee determines to request dismissal of the

derivative action, it shall prepare and file with the court a report or

78. Id. § 7.07 cmt. a.

79. Id. § 7.07 cmt. c.
80. Id. § 7.08 (citations omitted).
81. Id. § 7.08 cmt. a.
82. Id. § 7.08 cmt. c.
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other written submission setting forth its determinat-ions in a manner
sufficient to enable the court to conduct the review required under
[section] 7.10.8'
A mere procedural irregularity will generally not be fatal to the
corporation's aims. Under section 7.09(b), if the court is not prepared to
grant the motion to dismiss under section 7.08 or 7.11 because the
procedures of section 7.09(a) were not followed, the court should permit
the board or committee to supplement its procedure and to make such
further reports or other written submissions so as to satisfy section
7.09(a), unless the court decides that "(i) the board or committee did not
act on the basis of a good faith belief that its procedures and report were
justified in the circumstances; (ii) unreasonable delay or prejudice would
result; or (iii) there is no reasonable prospect that such further steps
would support dismissal of the action. " 84
Section 7.10 of the Principlesis an important section that addresses
the standard of judicial review to be applied to the board's motions to
dismiss under section 7.08. Under section 7.10(a)(1), the business
judgment rule standard should be applied if
the gravamen of the claim is that the defendant violated... [the duty
of care], other than by committing a knowing and culpable violation of
the law that is alleged with particularity, or if the underlying transaction or conduct would be reviewed under the business judgment rule
under [sections 5.03, 5.04, 5.05, 5.06, 5.08, or 6.02].M
This section counsels dismissal of the claim unless the court finds that
the board's or committee's determinations do not satisfy this rule.
Section 7.10(a)(2) states:
In other cases governed by Part V (Duty of Fair Dealing) or Part VI
(Role of Directors and Shareholders in Transactions in Control and
Tender Offers), or to which the business judgment rule is not applicable, including cases in which the gravamen of the claim is that
defendant committed a knowing and culpable violation of law.. ., the
court should dismiss the action if the court finds, in light of the
applicable standards under Part IV, V, or VI that the board or
committee was adequately informed under the circumstances and
reasonably determined that dismissal was in the best interests of the
corporation, based on grounds that the court deems to warrant
reliance.'

83. Id. § 7.09(a) (citations omitted).

84. Id. § 7.09(b).
85. Id. § 7.10(a)(1).

86. Id. § 7.10(a)(2).
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Section 7.10(b) addresses the retention of a significant improper
benefit by the defendant or an associate. It provides that the court
should not allow dismissal when doing so would allow the defendant or
an associate to retain a significant improper benefit in those cases in
which: (1) the defendant, either alone or with others who improperly
benefitted from the same transaction, has control of the corporation, or
(2) the benefit was obtained by fraud or without the advance authorization or ratification of the benefit by disinterested directors or shareholders, and in breach of section 5.02 or section 5,04.8s However, if the
court finds that the likely injury to the corporation from continuance of
the suit "convincingly outweighs any adverse impact on the public
interest from dismissal," it should dismiss the action." Developments
"subsequent to the time of the underlying transaction or conduct" are
relevant to the court's determination, including events subsequent to the
time of the board's motion for dismissal.89
Recognizing that the shareholders are the ultimate owners of the
corporation, "and as such cannot be excluded from a significant voice in
deciding matters affecting them,"' section 7.11 gives an overriding
right to the shareholders to dismiss a derivative action. The only
qualifications on this right are that certain procedural steps must be met
prior to the shareholders' vote, and that dismissal must not constitute
a waste of corporate assets. 91
Section 7.11 gives the shareholders this overriding power to dismiss
a derivative action provided certain procedures are followed and full
disclosure is made to the shareholders. The section advises the court to
dismiss a derivative action upon approval of a resolution by the
shareholders requesting dismissal because the action is not in the best
interests of the corporation.9 2 Dismissal should follow provided:
(a) A resolution recommending such dismissal ... was adopted by

the board... after a review and evaluation that substantially complied
with the procedures specified in [section] 7.09(a)(1)-(3)... or in which
any material departures from those procedures were justified under the
circumstances;
(b) Disclosure was made to the shareholders of all material facts...
and, if requested by plaintiff, the disclosure statement included a brief

87. Id. § 7.10(b).

88. Id.
89. Id. § 7.10(c).
90. Id. § 7.11 cmt. c.
91. Id. § 7.11.
92. Id.
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statement by the plaintiff summarizing the plaintiff's views [on the
matter];
(c) The resolution was approved by a vote of disinterested shareholders; and
(d) Dismissal would not constitute a waste of corporate assets.3
Comment a to section 7.11 notes that, as of the drafting of the ALI
Principles,no case appeared to have "sustained a shareholder ratification of a decision not to sue," but the comment acknowledges that section
7.11 is "consistent with repeated statements in the case law that
shareholders have this power."94
The scope of judicial scrutiny applied to a decision made under section
7.11 is substantially more restricted than under section 7.10. Provided
that the requisite procedures were followed and the required disclosures
were made, the court can only refuse to dismiss if doing so amounts to
a waste of corporate assets.9" This is in recognition of the fact that the
shareholders are the ultimate owners of the corporation.9
Comment d to section 7.11 provides that the utility of section 7.11 is
likely to be the greatest in four circumstances:
(1) when the action is against a person having "control," because the
special prophylactic restrictions in [section] 7.10(b) would become
applicable if the motion for dismissal had to qualify under [section]
7.08; (2) when [section] 7.09(a)(4)'s requirement that a report or other
written submission be filed with the court (which does not apply under
[section] 7.11) creates special difficulties (possibly because of concerns
about the loss of the attorney-client privilege); (3) when the corporation
is closely held so that shareholders can be easily solicited... ; and (4)
when the corporation wishes to make applicable the more deferential
"waste" standard of [section] 7.11(d)."
These latter two circumstances are the most likely to attract the use of
the section.9"
The Georgia Code is silent as to whether the shareholders have an
overriding power to request dismissal of a derivative action. O.C.G.A.
section 14-2-744 lists those groups entitled to make an independent
determination that the suit is not in the best interests of the corporation,
and the shareholders are not listed as one of the groups.

93.
94.
95.
96,
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id,
Id.
Id.

§ 7.11 (citations omitted).
§ 7.11 cmt. a.
§ 7.11 cmt. c.
§ 7.11 cmt. d.
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Section 7.12 of the ALI Principlesallows the corporation to move the
court for the appointment of "one or more individuals to serve as a panel
in lieu of a committee of directors for the purposes of [section] 7.08...
or [section] 7.11." None of these persons may "be interested in the action
or have a significant relationship with a senior executive of the
corporation or a similar relationship with any defendant or plaintiff."
This panel is to "conduct a review and evaluation and prepare a report
or other written submission as to the advisability of terminating the
action, in compliance with the procedures specified in [section] 7.09."'
The report or written submissions "should have the same status under
[sections 7.08, 7.10, 7.11, or 7.13] ...

as a report or other written

submission of the board or a properly delegated committee thereof.""' °
Unless the court otherwise directs, the corporation should bear the cost
of the inquiry and report or other written submission.'01
In lieu of appointing a panel under section 7.12(a), the court, on the
corporation's motion, "may appoint one or more individuals who are not
directors of the corporation and who meet the qualifications specified in
[section] 7.12(a) to serve on0 2a committee established by the corporation
under [section] 7.05(b)(1)."K
The principal use of this section arises when "a controlling person or
a majority of the board is sued in a derivative action and the board does
not have the requisite number of disinterested directors to staff a
litigation committee that complies with the standards set forth in
[section] 7.09(a)." 103
Georgia Code section 14-2-744(b)(3) parallels section 7.12(b). It
effectively allows the corporation to move the court for the appointment
of one or more independent persons to make a determination of whether
the derivative suit is in the best interests of the corporation."° This
section allows only one person to be appointed, even though section 14-2744(b)(2) requires the committee of directors to be comprised of at least
two persons. This is in recognition of the increased costs to the
corporation that the appointment of outside persons generates.0 5
For the purposes of section 14-2-744, none of the following facts alone
will cause a director to be considered not independent:

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. § 7.12(a).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 7.12(b).
Id. § 7.12 cmt. c.
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-744(b)(3) (1994).
Id. § 14-2-744 cmt.
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(1) The nomination or election of the director by directors who are
not independent;
(2) The naming of the director as a defendant in the derivative
proceeding; or
(3) The fact that the director approved the action being challenged
in the derivative proceeding so long as the director did not receive a
personal benefit as a result of the action."°
Section 14-2-744 deals generally with dismissal. It provides that the
court may dismiss the action if one of the groups listed in the section0 7 determines in good faith and after a reasonable investigation
that the suit is not in the best interests of the corporation. The
corporation bears the burden of proving good faith, the reasonableness
of the investigation, and the independence of the directors.'08
Section 7.13 of the ALI Principles sets out in detail the procedures,
burdens, and standards applicable to the board's motion (instituted
under section 7.08) or the shareholders' motion (instituted under section
7.11) to dismiss the plaintiff's derivative suit. Section 7.13(a) requires
that the corporation submit to the court a written report setting out the
procedures and determinations of the board or the committee thereof, or
the resolution of the shareholders calling for dismissal. A copy of this
report must be provided to the plaintiff's counsel."° If the report is
accompanied by an opinion of counsel, this opinion must also be given
to the plaintiff's counsel. 110 Section (b) grants the court discretion to
issue a protective order concerning the report."'
Section (c) sets forth the criteria governing when the court should
allow the plaintiff to engage in discovery prior to the court's decision
regarding dismissal of the action. To obtain a discovery order, the
plaintiff must show: (1) that "a substantial issue exists as to whether
the applicable standards of [sections 7.08 through 7.121 have been
satisfied;" and (2) that "the plaintiff is unable without undue hardship
to obtain the information by other means. " "2 The discovery order is

106. Id. § 14-2-744(c).
107. Section 14-2-744(b) provides that the dismissal determination be made by a
majority of independent directors, if they constitute a quorum; a majority of a committee
of independent directors appointed by a majority of independent directors, whether or not
they constitute a quorum; or the above described panel. Id. § 14-2-744(b).
108. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-744(a) (1994).
109. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 7.13(a).
110. Id. § 7.13(e).

111. Id. § 7.13(b).
112. Id. § 7.13(c).
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also subject to the court's general discretion in section 7.06 to stay a
derivative action."'
Provided the plaintiff overcomes these hurdles, the plaintiff is entitled
to "such limited discovery or limited evidentiary hearing, as to issues
specified by the court, as the court finds to be (i) necessary to enable it
to render a decision on the motion under the applicable standards of
[sections 7.08 through 7.121; and (ii) consistent with an expedited
resolution of the motion."" 4 Absent special circumstances, the court
should also "limit on a similar basis any discovery that is sought by the
plaintiff in response to a motion for summary judgment by the corporation or any defendant to those facts likely to be in dispute."" 5 A
protective order is also available for discovery garnered under this
section." 6
Section 7.13(d) supplies the standards that govern the burden of proof.
That subsection provides that the burden of proof will rest on the party
making the relevant allegation or raising the relevant defense. The
plaintiff has the burden of proof:
(1) under [section] 7.08 where the standard of judicial review is
determined under [section] 7.10(a)(1) because the basis of the claim [is
a breach of the duty of care] or because the underlying transaction
would be reviewed under the business judgment rule, or (2) under
[section] 117.07(a)(1)
(suits against third parties and lesser corporate
7
officials).

The corporation has the burden in motions "under [section] 7.08 where
the standard of judicial review is determined under [section] 7. 10(a)(2)
because the underlying transaction would be reviewed under a standard
other than the business judgment rule," except that the plaintiff has the
burden of showing: "(i) that a defendant's conduct involved a knowing
and culpable violation of law, (ii) that the board or committee ...

was

not capable of objective judgment.., as required by [section] 7.09(a)(1),
and (iii) that dismissal ...would permit a defendant or an associate...
to retain a significant improper benefit under [section] 7.10(b)."" 8
For the purposes of section 7.10(b), the corporation has the burden of
proving "that the likely injury to the corporation from continuation of
the action convincingly outweighs any adverse impact on the public

113. Id.
114. Id.

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. § 7.13(d).

118. Id.
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interest from dismissal of the action."'19 Where shareholders bring an
action for dismissal under section 7.11, the plaintiff has the burden of
proof for subsections (b),(c), and (d), but the corporation has the burden
with respect to subsection (a).' 20
Section 7.13(e) states that, subject to the requirement that any legal
opinion given to the court with the report under subsection (a) be given
to the plaintiff's counsel, communications between the board or
committee and its counsel will not cease to be privileged, and the
attorney's work product will not lose its privileged character either
because the action is derivative, or on the grounds that privilege was
of the report to the plaintiff or to the court
waived by the production
121
under section 7.13(a).

Section 7.14 requires the court to approve any settlement, discontinuance, or compromise of a derivative action between the plaintiff and a
defendant. The section provides two standards that should be met
before the court grants its approval. First, the "balance of corporate
interests" should favor the settlement; and second, the settlement should
be "consistent with public policy."122

In evaluating the proposed

settlement against these standards, "the court should place special
pecuniary and nonpecuniary
weight on the net benefit, including
23
elements, to the corporation."

This provision recognizes the fact that in some cases it may be in the
plaintiff's attorneys' interests to settle in cases in which such a
settlement is not necessarily in the interests of the shareholders. 24
This situation is exacerbated in derivative suits by two factors not
present in most other litigation: (i) the corporation usually pays the
derivative plaintiff's attorney's fees; (ii) and nonpecuniary settlements
are more commonplace and, indeed, are contemplated by section
7.14(b).125 The section only applies to voluntary settlements, not
dismissals in which, obviously, little prospect of collusion
involuntary
126
exists.

119. Id.

120. Id.
121.

Id. § 7.13(e). Comment e to § 7.13 notes that the cases have recognized a potential

exception to the privilege doctrine where the action is derivative because the plaintiff is
seeking to represent the corporation and privilege may not be asserted against one's own
client. Id.
122. Id. § 7.14(b).
123. Id.
124. Id. § 7.14 cmt. c.
125. Id. The section requires the court to consider the benefit to the corporation
"including pecuniary and nonpecuniary elements," Id. § 7.14(b).
126. Id. § 7.14 cmt. c.
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The shareholders are given a voice in any proposed settlement.
Section 7.14(c) provides that, except where their interests will not be
substantially affected, the shareholders must be given notice of any
proposed settlement and be provided with an opportunity for a hearing
to voice opposition to the settlement. At this hearing they may call
witnesses, conduct cross-examination,
and, with the court's approval,
127
undertake reasonable discovery.

Unfortunately, neither the comments nor the section itself provides
guidance as to how much weight is to be afforded vehement opposition
by shareholders to any proposed settlement that the court is otherwise
inclined to approve. The section does not seem to grant a right of veto
to the shareholders, but such considerable opposition would be given
weight by the court in determining whether the standards under section
7.14(b) have been met.
Georgia Code section 14-2-745 addresses this issue, but not in as much
detail as the ALI Principles. Section 14-2-745 requires court approval
prior to settlement or discontinuance, as well as notice and the
opportunity for shareholders to be heard if it is determined that they
will be substantially affected by the proposed settlement." According
to the comments in both the ALI Principlesand the Georgia Code, these
sections are consistent with modern federal practice requiring judicial
approval and notice for a settlement. Because the derivative suit is
brought for the benefit of the shareholders, they should be heard on the
matter.
Section 7.15 of the ALI Principlesgives the board the power to settle
a derivative action without the consent of the plaintiff, provided that the
court approves the settlement. The court should approve the settlement
if three conditions are met: (1) A disinterested board (or committee
thereof) must have conducted an adequate evaluation of the matter and
have followed the procedures in section 7.09 (procedures for requesting
dismissal of a derivative action). Any material departures from those
procedures must have been justified in the circumstances. (2) The section
7.14 provisions governing notice and an opportunity for a hearing to
affected shareholders were substantially complied with; and (3) In light
of the entire record, "the balance of corporate interests warrants
approval and the settlement or release is consistent with public policy."
In evaluating this, special weight is to be placed on the net benefit
(pecuniary and nonpecuniary) to the corporation.129 Regarding the
first requirement above, section 7.15(c) allows the court to consider the

127.
128.
129.

Id. § 7.14(c).
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-745 (1994).
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 7.15.
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conclusions of a specially appointed panel in lieu of a report submitted
from the board or a committee if the procedures required by section 7.12
were followed."3
Section 7.15(b) states the obvious. It provides that "[amny settlement
or release... constitutes a valid affirmative defense with respect to the
claims and liabilities covered" by the settlement to the same extent that
a settlement with the plaintiff's consent would under section 7.14. This
subsection also addresses an area in which there is very little case
law.'
The comments to the section note that the reason for requiring
judicial approval of any proposed settlement is to prevent the derivative
suit from being rendered totally ineffective by the corporation having the
power to settle meritorious claims for nominal consideration. 2 The
burden is on the proponents of the settlement, usually the board or a
committee thereof, to show that the standards of section 7.15(a)(1) to (3)
have been met. 33 Where such a settlement is approved, the plaintiff's
counsel will usually be entitled to attorneys' fees under section 7.17 for
having "caused" the result."
Similar to most states' laws, the Georgia Code does not specifically
address settlement procedures except as stated above. Georgia Code
section 14-2-744 (as it pertains to dismissals) does require a disinterested board, committee, or specially appointed panel to review and evaluate
the action prior to their determinations, but does not specifically mention
applicability to settlement, as does section 7.15(a)(1) of the ALI
Principles.
F

Recovery in Derivative Proceedings

The ALI Principles adhere to the proposition that the derivative
plaintiff effectively sues as the trustee or "next friend" of the corporation. 35 As such, any recovery in the suit accrues exclusively for the
benefit of the corporation. 136 Any plaintiff or attorney who receives
property or money from the suit holds it for the benefit of the corporation and is required to account to the corporation for it, "unless such
money or property was received pursuant to a judicial order or a
judicially approved settlement. " "'

130. Id. § 7.15(c).

131. Id. § 7.15 cmt. a.
132.

Id. § 7.15 cmt. c.

133.

Id. § 7.15 cmt. d.

134.

Id.

135. Id.
136. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 7.16.
137. Id.
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The only exception to this rule applies when the court, under section
7.18(e), has ordered that all or a portion of the proceeds be paid directly
to the shareholders on a pro-rata basis. The circumstances in which
such an order may be warranted are those in which "a substantial
portion of the shares are held either by persons who had aided or
abetted the defendants to commit the fiduciary breach or by noncontemporaneous holders who had suffered no injury" because they
The obvious aim of this
purchased at a price reflecting the injury.'
provision is to prevent the circulation of recovery and the unjust
enrichment of these shareholders.
The Georgia Code is silent on the issue of the disposition of any
recovery. In Schnorbach v. Fuqua,"9 however, the court regarded it
as "well settled" that, in shareholder's derivative suits, the recovery
"normally" goes to the corporation. 40 Indeed, this is the very nature
of the derivative suit: the plaintiff sues for, and on behalf of, the corporation.
G. Plaintiff'sAttorney's Fees and Expenses
The ALI Principles,in section 7.17, allow for the recovery of "reasonable attorneys' fees and other reasonable litigation expenses" from the
corporation by a successful plaintiff in derivative proceedings.""
However, this award of costs should not "exceed a reasonable proportion
of the value of the relief (including nonpecuniary relief) obtained by the
plaintiff for the corporation.""42
In providing only that the costs awarded should not exceed a
"reasonable proportion" of the value of the relief, the ALI deliberately
avoided choosing between the "lodestar" method of awarding costs and
the percentage-of-the-recovery formula.
The term "successful" in section 7.17 does not necessarily require a
plaintiff's verdict. It includes a settlement, or corporate action, that
substantially achieves the ends sought by the plaintiff. The test is
whether the plaintiff's action was a significant cause of the remedial
action taken by the defendant.'"
138. Id § 7.18 cmt. g. The mere fact that the breaching party was a shareholder,
however, will not necessarily result in a pro rata recovery. The court must also consider
the effect such an action would have on other parties, including creditors of the company.
Id.
139.

70 F.R.D. 424 (S.D. Ga. 1975).

140. Id.
141.
142.
143.
144.

ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 7.17.
Id.
Id. § 7.17 cmt. a.
Id. § 7.17 cmt. e.
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For the derivative action to have been of sufficient benefit to the
corporation to merit the award of costs, it must have had an effect
"'more than technical in its consequence'" and have achieved "'a result
which corrects or prevents an abuse which would be prejudicial to the
rights and interests of the corpo-ration or affect the ernjoyment
or
' " 145
protection of an essential right to the stockholder's interest.
O.C.G.A. section 14-2-746(1) states that the court may "order the
corporation to pay the plaintiff's reasonable expenses (including
attorney's fees)" if it finds that the corporation has substantially
benefitted from the derivative proceedings." Like the ALI Principles,
then, the Georgia Code requires some benefit to the corporation. Unlike
the ALI Principles,however, there is no facial requirement of success
under the Georgia Code. However, it is hard to imagine how a
derivative proceeding could confer a "substantial benefit" on the
corporation without at least reaching the level of success demanded by
the ALI Principles.
The Georgia Code has a punishment for unwarranted litigation similar
to that of the ALI Principles. Section 14-2-746(2) permits the court to
"order the plaintiff to pay any defendant's reasonable expenses
(including attorney's fees) ... if it finds that the proceeding was

commenced or maintained without reasonable cause or for an improper
purpose." 47
II. PART VII, CHAPTER 2: RECOVERY FOR BREACH OF DUTY
The ALI Principlesdevotes two sections to the corporation's right to
damages arising from derelictions of duty by its own directors or officers.
Section 7.18 governs when a corporation can recover from the purportedly delinquent director or officer, and section 7.19 regulates the extent to
which a corporation can, by its corporate charter, limit this right. The
scope of the duties themselves are dealt with elsewhere in this article." 4 This chapter deals exclusively with the remedies available to
the corporation, or its shareholders, once those duties have been
breached.

145. Id. § 7.17 cmt. d. (citing Bosch v. Meeker Cooperative Light & Power Ass'n, 101
N.W.2d 423, 427 (Minn. 1960)).
146. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-746(1) (1994).
147. Id. § 14-2-746(2). In Pfister v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 932 (N.D. Ga.

1980), the court held that, in such a case, costs may be awarded against the plaintiff's
attorney in the event the plaintiff has little or no assets.
148. See Marjorie Fine Knowles & Colin Flannery, The ALl Principlesof Corporate
Governance Compared with Georgia Law, 47 MERcER L. REv. 1, Parts IV, V & VI (1995).
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Under section 7.18(a), a defendant who violates the duty of care,149
the duty of fair dealing,"5 or the duties that arise during transactions
in control and tender offers, 5 ' is liable to the corporation (or, when a
direct action is permitted under section 7.01, to its shareholders) for the
losses that the violation caused. Where the violation is of the duty of
fair dealing, the defendant must, in addition to compensating the
corporation for any losses, disgorge to the corporation any gains made
by the defendant or by an associate of the defendant, "to the extent
necessary to make equitable restitution." 5 '
The Georgia Code also addresses the director's liability for breach of
duty. The director's duties themselves are set out in O.C.G.A. section
14-2-830.'15 It seems, however, that to visit liability upon a director
under Georgia law, it is not enough for the plaintiff to show that the
defendant breached the applicable duty. The comments to section 14-2830 provide that, in cases in which a director's conduct (or lack thereof)
falls short of the standards set by section 14-2-830, the director will not
necessarily be liable to the corporation. The director has the benefit of
the additional safe harbor provided by the business judgment rule. Only
if the defendant's breach of section 14-2-830 is so blatant as to fall short
of the less stringent requirements of the business judgment rule does
liability ensue. Essentially identical duties are imposed on officers by
section 14-2-843.
Section 14-2-831 provides that the company, or a shareholder in a
derivative suit, may sue directors or officers of the corporation for the
following relief:
(1) To compel the defendant to account for official conduct or to decree
any other relief called for by [the defendant's] official conduct in the
following cases:
(A) The neglect of, failure to perform, or other violation of [the
defendant's] duties in the management of the corporation or in the
disposition of corporate assets;
(B) The acquisition, transfer to others, loss, or waste of corporate
assets due to [the defendant's breach of duty]; or
(C) The appropriation, in violation of [the defendant's] duties, of
any business opportunity of the corporation;

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, Part IV.
Id., Part V.
Id., Part VI.
Id. § 7.18(a).
See discussion, Part IV, supra.
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(2) To enjoin a proposed unlawful conveyance, assignment, or transfer
of corporate assets, or other unlawful transaction where there is
sufficient evidence that it will be made; and
(3) To set aside an unlawful conveyance, assignment, or transfer of
knew of its unlawfulness and is
corporate assets where the transferee
154
made a party to the action.
Unlike the ALI, which makes no recommendation for a limitations
period, the Georgia Code section sets a four year limitation of acThe period begins running when the cause of action actions.155
1 56
crues.
This section reflects the long standing common law position in
Georgia.' 57 As the leading case held in 1913:
[T]hose who accept the position of directors impliedly undertake to
exercise ordinary care and diligence in the discharge of the duties thus
committed to them. They may commit the active transaction of the
business to duly authorized officers; but this does not absolve them
from the duty of reasonable supervision .... Unfortunately some
directors appear to think that they have fully discharged their duties
by acting as figureheads and dummies; but this is a mistake, and a
delusion from which some of them are now and then awakened by a
judgment for damages arising from allowing the corporation to be
looted while they sat negligently by and looked wise."5 "
The Georgia Code, following the approach of the Model Business
Corporations Act, treats one particular breach of duty separately, that
of an unlawful distribution to shareholders. Section 14-2-832(a) provides
59
that a director who votes for, or assents to, an unlawful distribution
to the shareholders, is personally liable to the corporation for that part
of the distribution which was illegal, if it is established that the director

154.
155.
156.
157.

O.C.G.A. § 14-2-831(a) (1994).
Id. § 14-2-831(b).
Id.
Comolli v. Comolli, 241 Ga. 471,473, 246 S.E.2d 278, 280(1978). "In Georgia the

1968 Corporation Code requires directors to act in 'good faith' and with ordinary 'diligence'
in all transactions .... This is the same duty that had been developed by case law prior
to the adoption of the 1968 Corporation Code." Id. (citing KAPLAN'S NADLER GEORGIA
CORPORATION LAW § 10-18 (1971)).
158. McEwen v. Kelly, 140 Ga. 720, 723, 79 S.E. 777, 779 (1913). See also KAPLAN'S
NADLER GEORGIA CORPORATIONS AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS § 309-10 (1993).

159. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-640(c) makes a distribution illegal if the effect of the distribution
is to make the corporation unable to pay its debts when they fall due, or if the distribution
causes the corporation's assets to be worth less than its liabilities and, unless the articles
provide otherwise, preferential rights. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-640(c) (1994).
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did so in breach of the director's duties to the corporation."6 The
director
does, however, have the benefit of the business judgment
16
rule.

1

Such an action by the director would probably fall within the purview
of section 14-2-831 in any event. However, when section 14-2-832 is
relied on, causation in fact need not be specifically proved. The mere act
of voting for, or assenting to, the distribution is sufficient to hold the
director liable.6 2 As with the ALI Principles," it is no answer to
the corporation's suit that the defendant's conduct was not causally
significant because a large number of other directors also voted for the
distribution. The term "distribution" includes not only money, but other
corporate property as well. It does not, however, include the corporation's own shares."6
O.C.G.A. section 14-2-832(b) provides that directors held liable are
entitled to a contribution from every other director who could be held
liable under the section for the unlawful distribution. The director is
also entitled to a return of the overpayment from each shareholder, if
the shareholder accepted it "knowing that the distribution was made in
violation of [the Georgia Code] or the corporation's articles of incorporation."" There is a two-year limitation period on an action for this
breach of duty."
The two main issues that often arise with respect to a director's breach
of duty, once that breach has been established, are causation and the
quantum of damages recoverable by the corporation.

160.

See id. § 14-2-830.

161. Id. § 14-2-832 cmt.
162. Id. § 14-2-832(a).
163. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 7:18 cmt. d.
164. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-140(6) (1994). The actual definition of distribution is
a direct or indirect transfer of money or other property (except its own shares) or
incurrence of indebtedness by a corporation to or for the benefit of its shareholders
in respect of any of its shares. A distribution may be in the form of a declaration
or payment of a dividend; a purchase, a redemption, or other acquisition of shares;
a distribution of indebtedness; or otherwise.

Id.
165. Id. § 14-2-852(b)(2).
166. Id. § 14-2-832(c). The comment does note that the purpose of the limitation period
is to clear up contingent claims in shorter periods than under the previous law (six years),
but no reason is given as to why it is only half as long as the period for breaches under
§ 14-2-831. Id. § 14-2-832 cmt.
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A.

Causation
Under section 7.18 of the ALI Principles,for losses to be recoverable,
they must have been caused by the violation.'67 The burden of proving
A two-prong test is suggested by
causation is on the plaintiff.'
section 7.18(b) for determining whether the defendant's conduct caused
the loss. The breach is the legal cause of the loss if "(i) satisfaction of the
applicable standard would have been a substantial factor in averting the
loss, and (ii) the likelihood of injury would have been foreseeable to an
ordinarily prudent person in like position to that of the defendant and
in similar circumstances." 9
This idea of causation is similar to the concept of causation in torts,
and indeed, the phrase "substantial factor" is borrowed from the
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 431.170 The first prong of the
test. deals with causation, and the second prong limits recovery to
foreseeable injury once causation in fact is established.
The fact that damage to the corporation would not have resulted but
for the acts or omissions of other individuals will not break the chain of
causation.17 This statement, contained in section 7.18(b), is designed
to address the issue of multiple corporate officials failing to perform a
duty that is the cause of the loss.'72 An obvious example is board
action or inaction that amounts to a breach of duty. Each defendant
might otherwise claim "that his or her conduct was less causally
Section 7.18(b) proscribes such
significant than that of others."'
attempts to dilute causation by pointing the finger at codefendants.
The ALI Principles take no position on whether the liability of
multiple defendants should be joint and several in such a case or should
be apportioned in terms of culpability among those responsible. 174 The
167. ALI PRINCIPLES § 7.18 cmt. a provides:
Section 7.18(b) recognizes the necessity of an adequate causal relationship between the defendant's breach of duty and any loss to the
Consistent with the case law, the burden is placed on the
corporation.
plaintiff to show that the defendant's conduct or omission was the cause
of the loss sustained by the corporation.
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 7.18 cmt. 2.
168. Id. § 7.18(c).
169. Id. § 7.18(b).

170. See id. § 7.18 cmt. a. This section of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS is
entitled What Constitutes Legal Cause and seeks to establish the causal relationship necessary for liability.

171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. § 7.18 cmt. d.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ALI Principles are also silent on whether a defendant subject to joint
and several liability should have a right of equitable contribution against
other corporate officials. 75 These matters are left to the law of the
individual jurisdictions.
Comment d to section 7.18 elaborates generally on causation. It
makes the point that it is more difficult to prove causation by omissions
rather than by affirmative acts. 17' This is particularly so when the
defendant was a member of a board, committee, or other body that
"might have rejected the defendant's judgment had the defendant alerted
fellow directors to the impending problem." 7 7
Comment d goes on to provide that causation should be analyzed in
two stages. Surprisingly, the approach suggested in comment d seems
to differ from the two-prong analysis set out in section 7.18(b) itself.
First, section 7.18(b) provides that the defendant's act or omission must
have been the cause-in-fact of the loss. The court must decide "whether
the loss would have been prevented had the defendant been adequately
diligent." If, and only if, the court answers the first question in the
affirmative does it proceed to the second question of proximate cause:
"Was the chain of causation too remote or attenuated for the loss in
question to be fairly ascribed to the defendant?" 78 This second
question, according to comment d, is answered by determining whether
the act or omission was a "substantial factor" in producing the loss.
The approach suggested by comment d seems to add an unnecessary
and somewhat confusing step to the determination of whether a director
is liable for any particular loss. No mention is made in comment d of
"reasonable foresight." Section 7.18(b) clearly contemplates reasonable
foresight as delineating the outer boundary of liability once causation in
fact has been established (which it is by showing that the breach was a
"substantial factor" in causing the loss). Comment d provides that the
"substantial factor" test is the second step of the analysis, limiting the
chain of legal causation once causation in fact has been established.
Section 7.18 clearly requires the "substantial factor" test to be used in
the first step to establish causation in fact, not to delineate the outer
boundary of liability once it is established. This latter task, section
7.18(b) states, is to be analyzed under "reasonable foresight."
Unlike the ALI Principles,the Georgia Code is silent about causation.
Case law, however, has essentially followed the same approach as the

175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.

178. Id.
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ALI Principles, requiring that the plaintiff prove causation.' 79 However, when the plaintiff can establish that a corporate opportunity has
been presented to a director or officer, the burden of proof is cast upon
the defendant to show that he or she did not violate the "fiduciary duties
of loyalty, good faith, and fair dealing toward the corporation." s
As with the ALl Principles,the analysis of causation is essentially the
same as it is in tort. If a director is to be held liable for a breach of the
duty of care, the breach of duty must have been the proximate cause of
the damage to the corporation. There is a surprising paucity of Georgia
authority on the issue. As one author notes, "[v]ery few cases discuss
proximate cause, usually holding the director not liable when there is no
clear chain of causation."' 8l
One such case that indirectly addresses the issue is Holland v.
Holland Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. 82 In that case, plaintiff
alleged that defendant, corporate vice-president, breached his duties to
the corporation in several ways, including refusing to guarantee loans
the corporation was endeavoring to obtain, and generally performing
poorly as a result of a drinking problem. Plaintiff offered no specific
proof of damages. The court held that, even if the various breaches of
duty could be made out, plaintiff still had to prove that the breaches
caused a loss and had to provide evidence of the quantum of damages
Because plaintiff failed to do so, the
with reasonable certainty.'
verdict in his favor was reversed.'"
B.

Damages

Both the Georgia Code and the ALI Principlesprovide that damages
are essentially compensatory in nature, and both place the burden of
proving damages on the corporation.8 5 Under the ALI Principles,the
measure of damages recoverable by the corporation, or a shareholder in
the case of a direct action, is the amount necessary to afford the
corporation full restitution for the losses it incurred as a result of the

179. See Holland v. Holland Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 208 Ga. App. 794, 796,
432 S.E.2d 238, 241 (1993).
180. Phoenix Airline Serv. v. Metro Airlines, 260 Ga. 584, 587,397 S.E.2d 699, 702-03
(1990).
181. ELLIOT GOLDSTEIN, GEORGIA CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE 217 (Supp. 1990)

(citing Goldstein, Directors, Duties, and Liabilities Under The Securities Act and
CorporationLaws, 36 WASH. L. REV. 759 (1979)).
182. 208 Ga. App. 794, 432 S.E.2d 238 (1993).
183. Id. at 794, 432 S.E.2d at 238.
184. Id. at 797, 432 S.E.2d at 242.
185. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 7.18(b); see Holland,208 Ga. App. 794,432 S.E.2d
238.
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defendant's breach.M This "precludes reduction of liability to reflect
ownership of the corporation's stock
either the defendant's proportionate
18 7
or the tax effect of the loss."
A breach of the duty of fair dealing is treated more harshly than the
other duties. This is because of the obvious element of moral turpitude
that attends the breach. Section 7.18(a) provides that gains received by
the defendant from a breach of the duty of fair dealing must be
disgorged to the corporation, irrespective of whether the company
"In some cases, the
suffered any independent monetary loss."
defendant will be required to account for gains that the corporation itself
could not have realized, on the principle that the agent is liable to the
any gains realized through improper use of the latter's
principal 1for
89
property."
Section 7.18(d) provides:
The losses deemed to be legally caused by a knowing violation of...
[the duty of fair dealing] include the costs and expenses to which the
corporation was subjected as a result of the violation, including the
counsel fees and expenses of a successful plaintiff in a derivative
action, except to the extent the court determines that inclusion of some
or all of such costs and expenses would be inequitable in the circumstances. 19
This fee-shifting does not apply to settlements.'
Consistent with the principle of compensation for net loss, the
defendant is allowed to offset, against the corporation's damages, any
gain to the corporation that the defendant can show arose out of the
same transaction, provided such an offset does not offend some public
policy."9 The burden of proof is on the defendant to prove any such
offsetting gains, 9 ' and gains from other, unrelated transactions are
not included in the calculation of damages.'"
Illustration 4 to section 7.18 provides a good example:

186. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 7.18 cmt. c (citing Liken v. Shaffer, 64 F. Supp.
432, 441 (N.D. Iowa 1946)).
187. Id.
188. Id. The concept has its genesis in the agent's liability to the principal. Comment
c refers to the RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 151 cmt. c.

189. Id.
190. Id. § 7.18(d).
191. Id. § 7.18 cmt. f. The rationale is the "difficulty of establishing the relative
responsibility of the parties in such cases." Id.
192. Id. § 7.18(c).
193. Id. § 7.18 cmt. e.
194. Id.
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A derivative action is brought to require a corporate official of XYZ
Corporation to account to the corporation for $200,000 in legally
questionable overseas political contributions. The defendant admits
the payments, but seeks to defend on the basis that in prior years
other such payments had produced profitable contracts. The court
should reject this defense.., because the alleged profits do not arise
out of the same transaction. Even if the offsets arise out of the same
transaction, the court should decline to permit offsets that it determines are contrary to an established public policy.'

As this illustration shows, the offset is discretionary and will be
refused if, in the court's judgment, it would "frustrate the policy of a
statute or another clearly established public policy."'" Once again, the
considerations that underlie the exercise of this discretion may lead to
a refusal in cases of unfair dealing.
Under
the Georgia Code, damages are also essentially compensato19 7
ry:

There can hardly be any dissent from the assertion that in the circumstances named, the corporate officers are liable to the corporation for
any loss or injury resulting to the corporation, but anotherand equally
sound rule of law is that the extent of liability of such an officer is the
amount of injury or damage suffered by the corporation. It is,

therefore, obvious that Kennedy could not be held personally liable
here, although he may have been ever so negligent, unless there is
evidence that would authorize a finding
that his negligence resulted in
98
loss or injury to the corporation.'

As is the general requirement with damages, the damages for a breach
of the director's or officer's duty must be proved with reasonable
certainty.' 99 Exact mathematical precision is not required, but the
court will not award damages that are merely speculative, vague, or
uncertain.0 0

195. Id. § 7.18 cmt. e, illus. 4.
196. Id. § 7.18 cnit. e.
197. See Johnson v. Kennedy, 201 Ga. 838, 41 S.E.2d 522 (1947).
198. Id. at 845, 201 S.E. at 526 (emphasis added).
199. Holland v. Holland Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 208 Ga. App. 794, 796, 432
S.E.2d 238, 241 (1993).
200. Id. at 796, 432 S.E.2d at 241.
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C. Limits on Directors'or Officers' Liability in the Corporate Charter
Section 7.19 allows a provision in the corporate charter that limits the
liability of an officer or director for a breach of the duty of care 201 to
a sum not less than that person's annual compensation (in the year of
the violation, not the year of the judgment), °2 provided failure to meet
the standard did not:
(1) Involve a knowing0" and culpable' violation of the law ... ;
[or]
(2) Show a conscious disregard for the duty... under circumstances
in which [the defendart] was aware that the conduct or omission
created an unjustified risk of serious injury to the corporation; 205 or
(3) Constitute a sustained and unexcused pattern of inattention that
amounted to an abdication of the defendant's duty to the corporation.W

Further, the defendant must not have received a benefit in breach of the
duty of fair dealing, 2 ' and the provision in the corporate charter must
have been adopted by a vote of disinterested shareholders after full
disclosure.20 8
Several considerations are presented in support of this section: simple
fairness; the enormous liability claims directors and officers may be
exposed to at the hands of the corporation; the cost of, and difficulties
encountered in securing, adequate insurance; the impetus the exposure
to liability may create in directors and officers to become overly adverse
to risk, thereby ultimately injuring the corporation; the removal of
judicial reluctance to find liability where a director will face a large

201. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 7.19 cmt. d. The duty of fair dealing is not
included for the obvious reason that limiting liability in such cases causes an unacceptable
risk of fraud or overreaching. Id.
202. Id. § 7.19 cmt. h.
203. "Knowing" does not require knowledge of the law, but merely knowledge of the
material facts that led to the violation of the law. Id. § 7.19 cmt. f.
204. "Culpable" can include knowing tortious violations of the law that are not criminal,
but which threaten the life or safety of others. Further, simply because a breach of the
criminal law is involved, it does not necessarily follow that the breach was culpable. Id.
205. Subjective awareness of an unjustified risk of serious injury to the corporation is
required. Gross negligence will not suffice. Id.
206. Id. § 7.19. Mere repetitive inattention will not suffice. The failure must go to the
core of the defendant's duties and is not excused by factors such as poor health. Id. § 7.19
cmt. f.
207. Id. § 7.19.
208. Id.
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damages judgment; and reduced economic incentives for plaintiffs'
attorneys to sue.20 9
Section 7.19 applies equally to direct and derivative actions, including
class actions such as those that might be brought by a shareholder
following a merger.2 10 The ALI specifically advised that it took no
position on whether a corporation should adopt such a provision in its
charter. Section 7.19 simply provides that, if the corporation chooses to
do so, its wishes should be recognized, subject to the restrictions
contained in the section.1
O.C.G.A. section 14-2-202(b)(4) permits, but does not require, the
articles of incorporation to contain a limitation, or a complete elimination of, the director's liability for breach of the duty of care or other
duty.212 While this may, at first, seem broader than the ALI Principles, no provision is permitted that can limit liability for any breach of
duty involving a wrongful appropriation of a business opportunity of the
corporation, intentional misconduct, a knowing violation of the law, an
unlawful distribution to shareholders, or a transaction in which the
director received an improper personal benefit.1 ' Further, no such
provision can be adopted with retrospective effect.214
Much of the conduct excluded by the ALI Principlesis, therefore, also
excluded under Georgia law. However, Georgia law allows a complete
elimination of liability for covered areas, whereas the ALI Principlesonly
allow a reduction of liability down to a minimum of one year's compensation and restrict the exculpation to the breach of the duty of care.
III. PART VII, CHAPTER 3: INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE
Both the ALI Principlesand the Georgia Code regulate when and how
a corporation should be able to indemnify a director engaged in
corporation-related litigation for the expenses and liabilities, if any, that
the director incurs in the suit.
The counterbalancing forces which act to mold these provisions are
obvious. On the one hand, the corporation has an interest in providing
protection to its senior executives, so as to make the positions attractive
to talented applicants, and in avoiding unduly conservative exercises of

209.
210.
211.
212.

Id. § 7.19 cmt. c.
Id. § 7.19 cmt. i.
Id. § 7.19 cmt. b.
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-202(b)(4) (1994).

213. Id.
214. Id.
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power by litigation-wary executives.21 5 On the other hand, an overly
broad economic immunity from suit may lead to cavalier, and even
dishonest, actions by directors who are secure in the knowledge that if
something does go wrong, the corporation, or an insurance company, is
there to "pick up the tab." It is for these latter reasons that both the
ALI Principlesand the Georgia Code omit most dishonest or reprehensible behavior from the scope of permissible indemnities.
The ALI Principles and the Georgia Code follow the same basic
pattern. In certain circumstances an indemnity is permitted, in other
cases it is mandatory, and in still other cases it is prohibited. As will be
detailed below, both schemes allow an advance of the indemnity on
certain conditions, and both allow insurance to be obtained in slightly
broader circumstances than those for which an indemnity is permitted.
A.

Permissive Indemnity
Section 7.20(a)(1) of the ALI Principlesprovides:
A corporation should have the power to indemnify.., a director•...
or* officer ... for liabilities and reasonable expenses incurred in
connection with any threatened... [or actual litigation or investigative
proceeding] to which the director or officer is or may be made a party
...or may be otherwise required to appear:
(A) Because such person was acting in [an official capacity],
or acting in some capacity on behalf of a third party at the request
of the corporation, if such person was acting in good faith or
(B) Solely because of the fact that such person is or was a
director or officer.2" 6

Virtually all conceivable proceedings will fall within the scope of this
section, including civil, criminal, and administrative proceedings. 17
The term "liabilities" is also broad and includes "settlement, judgments,
fines, and civil penalties, subject to the limitations of section 7.20(b)"
(prohibited indemnities) discussed below.218
The types of third parties envisioned by section 7.20(a)(1)(A) are
directors and officers "serving at the request of the corporation, including

215. The same considerations underlying the permissible limits on a director or officer's
liability under § 7.19 of the ALI PRINCIPLES support this section. The section is broader
than § 7.19, however, because, unlike § 7.19, it also extends to breaches of the duty of fair
dealing and to third party actions. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 7.20 cmt. c.
216. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 7.20(a)(1).

217. Id. § 7.20(aXl).
218. Id. § 7.20 cmt. d.
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service as a trustee or manager of the corporation's pension, profitsharing, and other compensation plans."219
The base requirement for the availability of the indemnity in section
7.20(a)(1)(A) is that the director acted in good faith. This means that,
provided this element is established, the director is not deprived of the
indemnity merely because he or she breached the duty of care or similar
standard.22
An example of the operation of section 7.20(a)(1)(B) is afforded by
illustration 3 to section 7.20.221 The illustration indicates that a
director sued for short swing trading profits under section 16(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 falls within the purview of the section
(subject, once again, to the restrictions discussed below) because the
action is based on his position as a director. On the other hand, a Rule
10b-5 action, for example, will not fall within the section, because the
defendant's directorship is superfluous to the cause of action.222
The power to indemnify contained in section 7.20, subject to the
limitations in 7.20(b), is additional to, and is not meant to restrict, any
power to indemnify contained in the corporation's standards, any
agreement, or otherwise.223
In Georgia, indemnification is dealt with in Part V of Article 8 of the
GeorgiaBusiness CorporationsLaw, O.C.G.A. sections 14-2-850 to 14-2859. Section 14-2-851 is the linchpin section and sets out the corporation's power to indemnify. As with the ALI Principles, the base
requirement is that of "good faith."224 Under subsection (a), the
corporation may indemnify a director against liability incurred in
"proceedings," if the director acted in a manner he or she "believed in
good faith to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation22 5 and, in the case of any criminal proceeding, [the director] had
no reasonable cause to believe [the] conduct was unlawful."2 6 As with
the ALI Principles,"proceedings" are defined to include threatened legal
action or suits, administrative matters, and investigations, whether civil

219. Id.
220. Id. § 7.20 cmt. e.
221. See id. § 7.20. Although the illustration appears to be directed toward
§ 7.21(a)(3XA), comment d offers the illustration as an example of the operation of
§ 7.20(a1)(B).
222. See id. § 7.20 illus. 4.
223. Id. § 7.20(e).
224. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-851 (1994).
225. Id. Where an employee benefit plan is involved, the director must have believed
in good faith that he or she was acting in the best interests of the participants in, and the
beneficiaries of, the plan. Id. § 14-2-851(b) (1989).
226. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-851(a) (1989).
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or criminal, formal or informal." 7 Although the section itself does not
refer to "expenses," "liability" is broadly defined in section 14-2-850 to
include the expenses of the litigation.228
In a similar vein to the ALI Principles,when the director is acting on
behalf of an employee retirement fund or as trustee on behalf of the
corporation, subsection (b) provides that the director must believe in
good faith that he229or she is acting in the interests of the beneficiaries of
the fund or trust.

The ALI Principles seem slightly broader than the Georgia Code
section in that the Georgia Code requires both good faith and a belief by
the director that he or she was acting in, or not opposed to, the best
interests of the corporation. The ALI Principlesintentionally omit this
latter requirement and allow for indemnity when the director merely
acted in good faith.2 ° The additional requirement of "best interests"
is absent.
Under O.C.G.A. section 14-2-851(c), the termination of proceedings by
judgment, order, settlement, conviction, or plea of nolo contendere is not,
of itself, determinative that the director did not act with good faith.
By
Such considerations are, however, of "considerable weight."2 3
contrast, "a final determination of nonliability or acquittal automatically
entitles the director to indemnification of expenses under section 14-2852 " 232 (which deals with mandatory indemnification).
B. MandatoryIndemnity
The ALI Principles provide that the company should be obliged, as
opposed to merely permitted, to indemnify a director for expenses and
liabilities, if the director is "wholly successful, on the merits or otherwise," in the proceedings, or if there is an obligation in the company's
charter, or its contract with the director, to do so. 23 The provision in

227. Id.§ 14-2-850(6). The official comments to the section provide:

"The broad

definition of 'proceeding' ensures that the benefits of this part will be available to directors
in new and unexpected, as well as traditional, types of proceedings whether civil, criminal,
administrative, or investigative. It also includes appeals in lawsuits and petitions to
review administrative actions." Id,§ 14-2-850 cmt.
228. Id. § 14-2-850(4).
229. Id. § 14-2-851(b).
230. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 7.20 cmt. e.
231. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-851 cmt. (1994). The comment continues; "by the same token, it
is clear that the termination of a proceeding by settlement or plea of nolo contendere
should not of itself create a presumption either that conduct met or did not meet the
standard of section 14-2-851." Id.
232. Id.
233. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 7.20(a)(3).
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the charter must itself be valid and obviously, no indemnity can be
obtained under this section where an indemnity is prohibited by the ALI
Principles.2"
The ALI Principleswill not impose mandatory indemnification where
the director is only partially successful in the litigation. For example,
if one of a number of claims against the director are dismissed, there is
no mandatory requirement that the company indemnify the expenses
attributable to that dismissed action.23 This follows the approach of
section 8.52 of the Model Business CorporationsAct, from which Georgia
has specifically departed.'
Section 7.20(c)(1) of the ALI Principlesprovides that the court should
order indemnification (and payment of the expenses the director incurred
in obtaining this court order) where the company is obliged to indemnify
the director, but fails to do so.
Under O.C.G.A. section 14-2-852, indemnification is mandatory (unless
the corporation is prevented from indemnification by its articles of
incorporation) when a director "has been successful, on the merits or
otherwise, in the defense of any proceeding to which [the director] was
a party, or in defense of any claim, issue, or matter therein, because he
[or she] is or was a director of the corporation."2 M7 The official comment notes that the intent of the section is, inter alia, to provide the
director with partial mandatory indemnification if the defendant
succeeds, by plea bargain or otherwise, in obtaining the dismissal of
some, but not all, counts of an indictment. 28 As noted above, the ALI
Principlesmandate an indemnity only when total success is achieved.
As with the ALI Principles,under the Georgia Code the director may
sue the corporation to enforce this right of mandatory indemnification,
and if the director is successful in obtaining the indemnification, the
23 9
corporation must also pay the director's costs of bringing the suit.

The director's suit can be brought as part of the proceedings in which he
or she has been named and for which he or she is seeking the indemnity.240 The ALI is silent on whether the director's suit for indemnity
should be appended to the proceedings for which the indemnity is
sought.

234,
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

See id. § 7.20 cmt. h.
See id. § 7.20 cmt. g.
See O.C.G.A. § 14-2-852 cmt. (1994).
Id. § 14-2-852.
Id. § 14-2-852 cmt.
Id. § 14-2-854.
Id.
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C. ProhibitedIndemnities
Both the ALI Principles and the Georgia Code place limits on the
corporation's power to indemnify directors or officers. The power urged
by the ALI Principles in section 7.20(a)(1) is qualified by section
7.20(b)(I) which provides that the corporation should have no power to
indemnify the director or officer:
(A) If the conduct... involved a knowing and culpable violation of
law or a significant pecuniary benefit was obtained to which the
director or officer was not legally entitled;
(B) To the extent that the indemnification would involve [the]
satisfaction of a fine, civil penalty, or similar judgment as a result of
violation of statutory law, the policy of which clearly precludes
indemnification;
(C) [For] any amount paid in settlement of the proceeding [where]
the conduct directly involved violation of statutory law, the policy of
which clearly precludes indemnification; or
(D)To the extent that the indemnification involves amounts paid (i)
in satisfaction of a judgment or in settlement of an action that was
brought by or in the right of the corporation, or (ii) for expenses
incurred in any such proceeding in which the director or officer was
adjudged liable to the corporation, [except for court ordered indemnification]. 241
The use of the term "directly" in paragraph (A) is to prevent an
indemnity from being prohibited where the conduct "only tangentially
involves a violation of law that is both knowing and culpable."242
The persuasiveness of a judgment, order, settlement, conviction, or
plea of nolo contendere by the director on the issue of whether the
director violated paragraph (A) appears to be the same as that under
Georgia Code section 14-2-851(c), discussed above.243
The requirement of "culpability" in paragraph (A) means "morally
reprehensible" and is in addition to "knowing," in that the mere fact that
a violation was knowing does not per se make it culpable.2' On the
other hand, unlike paragraphs (B) and (C), this paragraph is not limited
to breaches of the statutory law. Intentionally tortious conduct may, in
appropriate circumstances, suffice.2 4,

"Statutory law" for the purposes

241.

ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 7.20(b).

242.
243.
244.
245.

Id. § 7.20 cmt. h.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The clear
of paragraphs (B) and (C) includes valid regulations.'
intent of section 7.2(b)(1)(D) is to prevent the circularity of recovery,
when the corporation indemnifies the director for a judgment that it
received against that person.247
It seems that most conduct that falls afoul of paragraphs (A) to (D) in
section 7.20(b)(1) would, in any event, fail to meet the threshold
requirement of "good faith" necessary to trigger the power to indemnify
in section 7.20(a)(1)(A). The greater utility of these restrictions, perhaps,
is in their preventing indemnities otherwise payable under section
7.20(a)(1)(B), that is, when the defendant is made a party purely because
he or she was a director or officer, and when no element of good faith is
facially required.
Section 7.20(d) requires the corporation to report to its shareholders
whenever it indemnifies, or advances expenses to, a director or officer in
connection with proceedings by or in right of the corporation.248
After enumerating in sections 7.20(b)(1)(A) to (D) the limitations on
indemnification, the ALI Principles provide guidelines for determining
whether a director should be refused indemnification because of those
provisions. The decision may initially be made by disinterested
directors, shareholders, or counsel, but the director should have the right
to a de novo determination by the court.24' However, the court has an
overriding discretion to award the indemnification of money paid by the
director or officer in settlement of an action that would otherwise fall
within paragraph (A) or (D), other than when it is substantially likely
that the director or officer obtained a significant, improper pecuniary
benefit, or when doing so is not "fair and reasonable."2 50
The Georgia Code prohibits any payment to the director until it is
positively determined that the director acted in good faith. O.C.G.A.
section 14-2-855 provides that a corporation cannot indemnify a director
until it is determined that the director has met the good faith standards
of conduct required by O.C.G.A. section 14-2-851. That finding is to be
made by a majority of the board, excluding directors who are parties to
the proceedings, by special legal counsel selected by the board, or by
shareholders, excluding the shareholding of any interested director.25'
Under the Georgia Code, the determination of whether the director
acted in good faith is preliminary to the subsequent decision of whether

246.

Id.

247. Id.
248. Id. § 7.20(d).
249. Id. § 7.20(b)(1)
250.

Id. § 7.20(c)(2).

251. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-855(b) (1989).
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or not to indemnify the director. This second decision is broader in
scope, encompassing issues of the reasonableness of the expense and the
financial ability of the company to make the payment. The first decision
is simply whether the director is entitled to be considered for indemnification.252
The Georgia Code prohibits an indemnification "(1) In connection with
a proceeding by or in the right of the corporation in which the director
was adjudged liable to the corporation; or (2) In connection with any
other proceeding in which he was adjudged liable on the basis that
personal benefit was improperly received by him."' 3
The court is vested with a similar discretion to award an indemnity
like that suggested by the ALI Principles when the director does not
meet the requisite standard of conduct required by section 14-2-851(a)
or falls within this subsection.25 4 The prerequisites are those of the
ALI Principles-fairness and reasonableness.25 5 Unless the bylaws,
contract, articles, or shareholders' resolution provides otherwise, the
indemnity is limited to "reasonable expenses."255
Under section 14-2-856, the shareholders have an overriding right to
approve the indemnification of a director without regard to limitations
contained in the Georgia Code, if that right is authorized by the articles,
bylaws, contract, or resolution. However, such an indemnity is
prohibited when the director is held liable to the corporation, or enjoined
by the corporation for: (1) The misappropriation of a corporate
opportunity; (2) Intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of the
(4) Transaclaw; (3) Liability for unlawful distributions to 2shareholders;
57
tions involving an improper personal benefit.

Advances of the indemnity are permitted on identical terms to

2
advances under section 14-2-853, discussed below. 1

D. Advancement of the Indemnity
259 and the Georgia Code 2' allow the corpoBoth the ALI Principles
ration to advance the director the indemnity prior to final disposition of
the matter for which the indemnity is sought. Section 7.20(a)(2) of the

252.
253.

Id. § 14-2-855 cmt.
Id. § 14-2-851(d).

254. Id. § 14-2-854.
255. Id.
256.

Id.

257.
258.

Id. § 14-2-856(b).
Id. § 14-2-856(c).

259.
260.

ALI PRINcIPLEs, supra note 2, § 7.20(a)(2).
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-853 (1994).
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Principlesprovides that the corporation should have the power to pay
the expenses in advance, upon receiving an undertaking from the
director or officer to repay the advance if it is ultimately determined that
they were not entitled to be indemnified.
The section does not require any specific procedure to be adopted by
the corporation prior to advancing the expenses." 1 In particular, a
finding that the director is entitled to the indemnity by virtue of section
7.20(b)(1) is not a prerequisite to advancement of the expenses. 6 2
However, if it is ultimately determined that the director was not entitled
to the indemnity, the money has to be repaid." When the director is
wholly successful on the merits, the money does not have to be
repaid.2
The corporation can compromise or waive this right to repaymerit, as
with any other claim it might have against the director. However, if the
director has been adjudged liable to 265
the corporation in a derivative suit,
the waiver requires court approval.
Similarly, under the Georgia Code, a corporation may advance a
permissible reimbursement prior to final disposition of the proceedings,
"if the director furnishes the corporation a written affirmation of his
good faith belief that he has met the standards of conduct" set forth in
section 14-2-851(a) and furnishes a signed undertaking "to repay any
advances if it is ultimately determined that he is not entitled to the
indemnification."2 66 The undertaking "must be an unlimited general
obligation of the director but need not be secured and may26be accepted
without reference to financial ability to make repayment."
With respect to the question whether the determination of good faith,
which is required by section 14-2-855 before an indemnity can be made,
is also necessary prior to an advance of the indemnity pending the
outcome of the proceedings, the Georgia Supreme Court, in Service Corp.
International v. H.M. Patterson & Son,268 held that a determination
was not required and that the director providing the requisite affirmation and undertaking were the only prerequisites to the advance. 9
Under both the ALI Principles and the Georgia Code, the director's
indemnity right extends to his or her personal representative upon the

261.
262.
263.
264.

ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 7.20 cmt. f.
Id.
Id. § 7.20(a)(2).
Id. § 7.20 cmt. f.

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id.
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-853(a) (1994).
Id. § 14-2-853(b).
263 Ga. 412, 434 S.E.2d 455 (1993).
Id. at 414, 434 S.E.2d at 457.
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death of the director: Section 7.20(f) of the ALI Principles specifically
says so, and the definition of "director" in the Georgia Code includes
personal representatives.2 7
E.

Insurance

The ALI Principlesstate that, irrespective of whether the company has
the power to indemnify the director as provided in section 7.20(a)(1), it
should nevertheless have the power to purchase insurance to cover the
27
expenses and liabilities incurred by the director in such proceedings. '
The only limitations are that a corporation should not be entitled to
insure a director against conduct involving a knowing and culpable
violation of law, or against conduct involving a significant pecuniary
benefit to which the person was not entitled.272
Therefore, subject to these limitations, the section, "permits the
purchase of insurance policies that would cover amounts paid in
settlement or adverse judgments in derivative actions even though the
corporation could not itself make such payments."2 73
Georgia grants the corporation the right to insure its directors or
officers. 274 No limit on this right is found in the Georgia Code. The
drafters apparently felt that the insurance market provided adequate
27 5
protection against coverage for things like willful self-dealing.

IV. PART VII, CHAPTER 4: THE APPRAISAL REMEDY
The Introductory Note to the ALI chapter on the appraisal remedy
makes the point that this remedy is an attempt to balance the overall
need for flexibility in corporate governance with the minority's need to
rely on basic, legitimate expectations about its shareholding rights. 6
The remedy seeks to recognize the necessity for majoritarian control,
while providing a counterbalance
in order to avoid misuse of the power
277
vested in the majority.
Similar considerations also underlie the Georgia remedy. The
comment to the Georgia remedy, called "dissenter's rights" in the
Georgia Code, provides:

270.

O.C.G.A. § 14-2-850(2).

271.

ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 7.20(a)(4).

272. Id. § 7.20(bX2),
273. Id. § 7.20 cmt. i.
274.
275.
276.
277.

O.C.G.A. § 14-2-858 (1994).
See id. § 14-2-858 cmt.
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, Introductory Note to Part VII, Chapter4.
Id.
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The theory underlying this section is as follows: when a majority of
shareholders has approved a corporate change, the corporation should
be permitted to proceed even if a minority considers the change unwise
or disadvantageous, and persuades a court that this is correct. Since
dissenting shareholders can obtain the fair value of their shares, they
But the prospect that shareare protected from pecuniary loss ....
holders may be "paid off" does not justify the corporation in proceeding
unlawfully or fraudulently. If the corporation attempts an action in
violation of the corporation law on voting, in violation of clauses in
articles of incorporation prohibiting it, or by deception of the shareholders-to take some examples-the court's freedom to intervene should
be unaffected by the presence or absence of dissenters' rights under
this article.278
There are four main issues that arise in connection with the exercise
of the appraisal remedy: (1) which corporate actions trigger the remedy;
(2) the procedural requirements for exercising the remedy; (3) the
valuation of the shares; and (4) whether the remedy is exclusive.
A.

Transactions That Giue Rise To The Remedy

The transactions giving rise to the remedy under the ALI Principles
are listed in subsections 7.21(a) to (e). These will be discussed in turn.
Section 7.21(a) provides:
A merger, a consolidation, a mandatory share exchange, or an
exchange by the corporation of its stock for substantial assets or equity
securities ... of another corporation (hereinafter collectively referred
to as a "business combination"), whether effected directly or by means
of a subsidiary, unless those persons who were shareholders of the
corporation immediately before the combination own 60 percent or
more of the total voting power of the surviving or issuing corporation
immediately thereafter, in approximately the same proportions (in
relation
to the other preexisting shareholders) as before the combina9
tion;

27

Most of the transactions falling within this section are "transactions in
control" under section 1.38.28 ° Subsidiaries are included to ensure that
the remedy cannot be avoided by simple triangular mergers, and the
reflect the de facto merger doctrine
section is generally intended to 281

which developed at common law.

278. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1302 cmt. (1994).
279. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 7.21(a).
280. See id. § 7.21 cmt. c(1).
281. Id.
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Section 7.21 (b) provides:
Any business combination, amendment of the corporation's charter
documents. .

.,

or other corporate act or transaction that has the effect

of involuntarily eliminating the eligible holder's equity interest ...
(other than the elimination of less than a round lot in a publicly traded
corporation or a similar elimination of a comparably insignificant
interest in a non-publicly traded corporation);282
This section is directed toward "freeze out" transactions, even if the
business combination falls below the sixty percent commonality of
ownership threshold that triggers section 7.21(a).2" The section is
meant to include reverse stock splits with a significant freeze-out effect,
but not traditional, low-ratio stock splits which have a legitimate
purpose and merely an incidental, de minimis freeze-out effect.2 ' It
is not the intent of the section to discourage freeze-outs, but simply to
protect the minority when they occur.285
Section 7.21 (c) provides:
A sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of substantial assets by the
corporation that
(1) Falls within [section] 5.15(a) (Transfer of Control in
Which a Director or Principal Senior Executive Is Interested) and
the assets so disposed of would account for a majority of the
corporation's earnings or total assets.., as of the end of its most
recent fiscal year, unless (A) the procedures specified in [section]
5.15 (b)(1)-(3) are complied with, and (B) at least one class of
equity securities ...

of the corporation is listed on a national

securities exchange or is included within NASDAQ's National
Market System; or
(2) Leaves the corporation without a significant continuing
business, unless the sale (A) is in the ordinary course of business,
or (B) is for cash or for cash equivalents that are to be liquidated
for cash or used to satisfy corporate obligations, and is pursuant
to a plan of complete dissolution by which all or substantially all
of the net assets will be distributed to the2 8shareholders within one
year after the date of such transaction;

282. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 7.21(b).
283. Id. § 7.21 cmt. c(2).
284. Id. Three reasons are given for the publicly held corporations exception.
Such eliminations almost invariably have a business purpose, they are probably

never used to effect a freeze-out, and the appraisal remedy is unlikely to be
effective in such a case. Id.

285. Id. § 7.21 cmt. c(2).
286. Id. § 7.21(c).
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The focus of the section is purposely on whether there exists a
significant continuing business after the transaction, rather than on the
quantitative amount of the assets transferred.8 7 Subsection (c)(1) will
usually not include a simple divisional buyout unless the transaction
amounts to a management buyout within section 5.15(a). 28 However,
if the procedure of section 5.15(b) is complied with, no appraisal rights
arise, 8the
potential conflict being adequately regulated by that proce29
dure.

Section 7.21(d) provides:
An amendment of [the corporation's charter] whose effect is to (1)
materially and adversely alter or abolish a preferential, preemptive,
redemption, or conversion right applicable to the eligible holder's
shares, or (2) reduce the number of shares owned by the eligible holder
(other than a holder of less than a round lot in a publicly traded
corporation or a similar holder of a comparably insignificant interest
in a non-publicly traded corporation) to a fraction of a share or less, or
(3) create a right to redeem the eligible holder's shares, or (4) exclude
or limit the voting rights of shares with respect to any matter, other
than simply through the authorization of new shares of an existing or
new class, or the elimination of cumulative voting rights;2
Only the affected shareholders may rely on the section.2" A limitation
on subsequent holders, however, can affect existing holders by reducing
the value of the shares.2
Finally, section 7.21(e) allows for application of the appraisal remedy
to any action in which the corporate charter, other than the bylaws,
grants the shareholder appraisal rights.293
Under the Georgia Code, dissenters' rights are triggered by the
following actions:

287. Id. § 7.21 cmt. c(3). Illustration 1 provides: X Corp., a conglomerate, has three
equal-sized divisions making plastics, sporting goods, and telecommunications equipment,
respectively, each having revenues of approximately $30 million annually. It sells the first
two divisions to ABC Corp. but continues to operate the last division. No appraisal right[s
accrue under § 7.21(c). Id. § 7.21 cmt. c(3), illus. 1.
Had the remaining division held only passive real estate investments there would be no
significant continuing business and appraisal rights would arise. See id. illus. 2.
288. Id. § 7.21 cmt. c(3).
289. See id. § 5.15(b), § 7.21 cmt. c(3), illus. 3.
290. Id. § 7.21(d).
291. Id. § 7.21 cmt. c(4).
292. Id.
293. Id. § 7.21(e).
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(1) A merger for which shareholder approval is required under the
Georgia Code 2 or the articles of incorporation and on which the
shareholder is entitled to vote, or the merger of a subsidiary into its
parent company.295
(2) A share exchange in which the corporation's shares will be
acquired, "if the shareholder is entitled to vote on the plan."2
(3) A sale or exchange of substantially all of the corporation's assets,
if a shareholder vote on the action is required under the Code,2 97 but
excluding court-ordered sales or sales in which the proceeds will be
distributed to shareholders within one year of the sale.' 9
(4) An amendment of the Articles that materially and adversely affects
the dissenting shareholder's rights because it:
(A) Alters or abolishes their preferential rights;2
(B) Creates, alters, or abolishes the redemption rights attending
the shares, including an alteration of any provision for a sinking fund
for the repurchase or redemption of the shares; 3°°
(C) Alters or abolishes their preemptive rights to acquire shares
or other securities;"'
(D) Excludes or limits their voting rights, except by diluting the
issuing other shares or securities with similar
voting rights 0through
2
voting rights;
(E) Reduces the shareholding to a fraction of a share, if the
fraction is to be acquired for cash;30 3 or

(F) "Cancels, redeems, or repurchases all or part of the shares of
the class." 0 4
(5) Any corporate action for which the Code provisions governing Close
Corporations, 0 5 the articles, bylaws, or a resolution of the board
provides that voting or nonvoting shareholders are entitled to appraisal
of their shares. 3°

294. The circumstances in which shareholder approval is required for a proposed
merger are contained in O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1103 (1989).

295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1302(a)(1) (1994).
Id. § 14-2-1302(a)(2).
The Georgia Code section that determines this is OC.G.A. § 14-2-1202 (1994).
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1302(a)(3) (1994).
Id. § 14-2-1302(a)(4).
Id.
Id.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-604 gives the corporation a right to acquire fractional shares.
Id. § 14-2-1302(aX4).
Id. §§ 14-2-901 to -950.
Id. § 14-2-1302(5).
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However, there is no appraisal remedy when the company is listed on
a national securities exchange0 7 or when it is held of record by more
than two thousand shareholders, unless: (1) in a merger or share
exchange, the shareholders are required to receive anything except
shares of the surviving corporation or another corporation so listed or
held by more than two thousand shareholders, "except for scrip or cash
payments in lieu of fractional shares;" or (2) "the articles of incorporation
or a resolution approving the transaction provides otherwise." 308
Several provisions of Article 9 of the Georgia Code, which deals with
Close Corporations, also trigger dissenters' rights. A shareholder who
votes against an election of statutory close corporation status may
dissent,s0s as may a shareholder who votes against an election to
terminate such status.31 0 A close corporation may also elect, in its
articles of incorporation, for a mandatory buyout of deceased shareholders."'1 The procedures and price formula1 2 may be modified by an
amendment to the articles, and shareholders who vote against the
amendment are entitled to dissenters' rights, if the amendment
terminates or substantially alters the shareholders' existing rights to
have the shares held purchased.1 3
Georgia allows a record shareholder whose shares are owned
beneficially by more than one person to dissent with respect to one such
person's shares and not to dissent with respect to the other person or
persons' shares. However, the record shareholder is unable to dissent
with respect to some of the shares held beneficially by one person and
can elect not to dissent with respect to the rest of the shares held by
that same person. 4 When a record shareholder does dissent with
respect to a beneficial shareholder, the record shareholder must notify
the corporation of the name and address of each person on whose behalf
he or she dissents.1 5 The "record shareholder" means the person in
307. A "national securities exchange" is defined in O.C.G.A. § 14-2-140(16) as any
exchange or securities quotation system which is exempt from the Georgia Blue Sky
registration requirements by virtue of paragraph (8) or paragraph (8.1) of O.C.G.A. § 10-58. This currently means the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, the
Midwest Stock Exchange, the Pacific Coast Stock Exchange, the Philadelphia-BaltimoreWashington Stock Exchange, the NASDAQ National Market System and any other stock
exchange approved by the Georgia Commissioner of Securities.
308. Id. § 14-2-1302(c).
309. Id. § 14-2-902.
310. Id. § 14-2-931.
311. Id. § 14-2-914.
312. Id. §§ 14-2-915 to -917.
313, See id. § 14-2-1302 cmt.
314. Id. § 14-2-1303.

315. Id.
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whose name the shares are registered in the records of the corporation,316 whereas the "beneficial shareholder" is the person who is the
effective equity owner of the shares.317
There is no procedure in Georgia for beneficial shareholders to dissent
directly; they must do so through the record shareholder. The comment
to section 14-2-1303 notes, "The fiduciary duties of nominees ... will
require them to dissent when requested by the beneficial owners, unless
with trust power to exercise their own discretion and
they are trustees
31 8

judgment."

B. Procedurefor Exercisingthe Appraisal Remedy
The procedure recommended by the ALI for enforcing the appraisal
remedy is contained in section 7.23. The corporation is required to give
This
adequate notice to shareholders of their appraisal rights." 9
notice is to be given "reasonably in advance of the date on which the
transaction is to be voted upon by the shareholders, or, if no shareholder
vote is required, the date on which the corporate action giving rise to
appraisal is to be taken."3 20 This notice should: (1) "Describe the
method for exercising the right," including the procedural requirements;3 2' (2) "Disclose the material facts" concerning the proposed
transaction and include copies of the corporation's financial statements;2 2 and (3) "Provide a reasonable means by which eligible
holders ...

can easily and effectively indicate their election to dis-

sent."
To utilize the right, the shareholder should be required to do no more
than the notice requires or otherwise provide a written election to
dissent prior to the shareholders' meeting, or, if no shareholder vote is
to be taken, prior to the date on which the corporate action giving rise
to the appraisal right is taken.324 There should be a reasonable period
between this date and the date the shareholder received the notice in
which to elect to dissent. 25 If the company does not give notice, "any

316. Id. § 14-2-1301(7).
317.

Id. § 14-2-1301(1).

318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.

Id. § 14-2-1303 cmt.
ALI PRINcIPLES, supra note 2, § 7.23(a).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 7.23(a)(ii) to (iv).
Id. § 7.23(b).
Id.
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eligible holder may initiate an appraisal proceeding without taking any
other action." 32s
Promptly after consummation of the transaction giving rise to the
appraisal rights and upon tender of the dissenting shareholder's shares,
the corporation should pay its reasonable estimate of the fair value of
the shares, plus any interest due.'27 Acceptance of the prepayment by
the shareholder is not a waiver of his or her appraisal rights."'
If payment is not made within thirty days of the tender of the shares
(or of the corporate action giving rise to the rights, whichever is later),
or if the amount paid is "materially less than the amount ultimately
determined by the court to constitute fair value, the corporation should
be required to pay all costs and expenses of the appraisal proceeding,"
including attorney and experts fees. 29
In all other cases the costs and expenses shall be determined "as the
court deems equitable," except that the corporation's attorney fees can
shareholder's action was
only be assessed against the shareholder if3the
0
faith."
good
in
not
or
vexatious,
"arbitrary,
When the court is required to value the shares, interest "should be
paid at the time of the payment of the award." 3 ' It should be computed on the amount of the award, less any prepayment from the time the
triggering transaction is consummated, at an "appropriate market
rate."3 32 Comment h notes that this rate will generally be the rate
that the corporation pays on its short-term bank debt.3 3
Section 7.23(f) provides for consolidated proceedings:
If there are any dissenting holders, the corporation should commence
a consolidation proceeding in the state of incorporation ... to fix fair
value and determine eligibility to dissent. All dissenting holders
should be made parties to the action. If such a consolidated action is
not commenced by the corporation within a reasonable time after
consummation of the transaction . .. , it may be commenced by any
dissenting holder. The court may appoint a lead counsel or steering
committee to coordinate discovery and the trial of the proceeding and
to represent any dissenting holders who have not secured other
counsel. The court should also require the corporation to provide it

326. Id.
327. Id. § 7.23(c). Interest is payable under § 7.23(e) from the date of the consummation of the transaction that gave rise to the appraisal rights. Id.
328. Id.

329. Id. § 7.23(d).
330. Id.

331. Id.
332. Id. § 7.23(e).

333. Id. § 7.23 cmt. h.
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with the names and addresses of all dissenting holders known to the
corporation, and, subject to appropriate restrictions, such list should be
available for inspection by dissenting holders or their agents.33
Under the Georgia Code, a shareholder wishing to exercise dissenters'
rights must be prudent in observing the procedural requirements
mandated by the Code. The failure to do so can result in a loss of the
dissenters' rights.338 A "Dissenter" is defined in section 14-2-1301 as
"a shareholder who is entitled to dissent from corporate actions under
section 14-2-1302 and who exercises that right when and in the manner
required by Code Sections 14-2-1320 through 14-2-1327. " 8s6
As with the ALI Principles, Georgia law requires the corporation to
take the first step in the procedure. If a proposed corporate action
creating dissenters' rights is to be submitted to a shareholders' meeting,
the notice must state that the shareholders are entitled to dissent, and
it must be accompanied by a copy of Article 13 of the Georgia Code,337
the article discussed here. If the action is to be taken without a
shareholders' vote, the corporation must notify "all shareholders entitled
to assert dissenters' rights ... and send them the dissenters' notice
described in Code Section 14-2-1322
no later than ten days after the
33 8
corporate action was taken."
When the proposed corporate action is submitted to a vote at the
shareholders' meeting, a record shareholder wishing to assert dissenters'
rights "must deliver to the corporation before the vote is taken written
notice of [the shareholder's] intent to demand payment for [the] shares
if the proposed action is effectuated; and ... must not vote ... in favor
of the proposed action." 39 If the shareholder fails to carry out both of
these steps (either failing to deliver the notice or voting in favor of the
proposed action) the shareholder loses his or her dissenters' rights.3 4
The comment to section 14-2-1321 notes that the notice from the
shareholder serves two purposes. First, it "enables other voters to
determine how much of a cash payment may be required" to carry out
the proposed action, and second, it "serves to limit the number of persons
to whom the corporation must give further notice, including the technical
details of the depositing share certificates." 4 '

334.
335.

Id. § 7.23(f).
See O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1321(b) (1994).

336. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1301 (1994).
337. Id. § 14-2-1320(a).

338. Id. § 14-2-1320(b).
339. Id. § 14-2-1321(a).
340. Id. § 14-2-1321(b).
341. Id. § 14-2-1321 cmt.
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When the corporate action creating the dissenters' rights is approved
at the shareholders' meeting, the corporation must deliver a written
dissenters' notice to all shareholders who complied with section 14-21321. It must be sent no later than ten days after the action was taken
and must:
(1) State where the payment demand must be sent and where and
when certificates for certificated shares must be deposited;
(2) Inform holders of uncertificated shares to what extent transfer of
the shares will be restricted after the payment demand is received;
(3) Set a date by which the corporation must receive the payment
demand, which date may not be fewer than 30 nor more than 60 days
after the date the notice... is delivered; and
(4) Be accompanied by a copy of [Article 13 of the Georgia Code.]342
The comment to this section explains that "[t]he basic purpose of [this
section] is to require the corporation to tell all actual or potential
dissenters what they must do in order to take advantage of their right
of dissent."343 The comment further notes, "[i]n the case of a transaction not involving a vote by shareholders, the dissenter's notice must be
sent to all persons who are eligible to dissent and demand payment."3 "
The notice must also "contain or be accompanied by a form which [a
dissenter] may use to complete the demand for payment under section
14-2-1323." 4B This form must "specify the date by which the payment
demand must be received by the corporation" (at least thirty and no
more than sixty days after the effective date of the notice of how to
demand payment).4 8
Once the shareholder receives the notice from the corporation, the
shareholder "must demand payment and deposit [the share] certificates
in accordance with the terms of the notice." 47 If the shareholder fails
to do so by the date set in the dissenters' notice, the shareholder loses
the dissenters' rights.34"
Under section 14-2-1324, the corporation
may restrict the transfer of uncertificated shares from the date the
demand for their payment is received until the proposed corporate
action is taken, or the restrictions released under Code Section 14-21326 ....The person for whom the dissenters' rights are asserted as
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.

Id. § 14-2-1322.
Id. § 14-2-1322 cmt.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.§ 14-2-1323.
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to uncertificated shares retains all other rights of a shareholder until
these rights are canceled or modified by the taking of the proposed
corporate action. 9
Section 14-2-1325 provides:
within ten days of the later of the date the proposed corporate action
is taken or receipt of a payment demand, the corporation shall by
notice to each dissenter who [made a timely demand for payment] offer
to pay to such dissenter the amount the corporation estimates to be the
60
fair value of his or her shares, plus accrued interest."
This offer must be accompanied by:
(1) The corporation's balance sheet as of the end of a fiscal year ending
not more than 16 months before the date of payment, an income
statement for that year, a statement of changes in shareholders' equity

for that year, and the latest available interim financial statements, if
any;
(2) A statement of the corporation's estimate of the fair value of the
shares;

(3) An explanation of how the interest was calculated;
(4) A statement of the dissenters' right to demand payment under Code
Section 14-2-1327; and
(5) A copy of [Article 131.3"1

Also, if the shareholder accepts the corporation's offer by written
notice within thirty days, or is deemed to have accepted it by a failure
to respond within thirty days, payment must be made within sixty days
from the making of the offer or the taking of the proposed corporate
action, whichever is later. 52
If the corporation ultimately does not take the proposed action which
gave rise to the dissenters' rights "within 60 days after the date set for
demanding payment and depositing share certificates, the corporation
shall return the deposited certificates and release the transfer restrictions imposed on uncertificated shares."6 3 Section 14-2-1326 provides:
"If after returning deposited certificates and releasing transfer restrictions, the corporation takes the proposed action, it must send a new
dissenters' notice ... and repeat the payment demand procedure. " 54
"

349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.

Id. § 14-2-1324.
Id. § 14-2-1325.
Id. § 14-2-1325(b).
Id. § 14-2-1325(c).
Id. § 14-2-1326(a).
Id. § 14-32-1326(b).
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If the shareholder is dissatisfied with the payment offer, the shareholder may notify the corporation in writing of his or her own estimates
of fair value and interest due and demand payment for this amount. 5 '
This right also arises if the corporation, "having failed to take the
proposed action, does not return the deposited certificates or release the
transfer restrictions imposed on uncertificated shares within 60 days
after the date set for demanding payment." 6
Dissenters waive the right to demand payment and are deemed to
have accepted the corporation's offer unless they notify the corporation
of their objections within the thirty days. 57
If the corporation fails to make the offer required by section 14-2-1325
within the set ten days, the shareholder may demand the information
that was required to accompany the offer, and it must be provided
within ten days of that demand.358 The shareholder may also submit
to the corporation his or her own estimate of the value of the shares at
any time and demand payment,3 59 subject only to the limitation of
actions period of three years."a '
Section 14-2-1330, providing for court action, states: "Ifa demand for
payment under Code Section 14-2-1327 remains unsettled, the corporation shall commence a proceeding within 60 days after receiving the
payment demand and petition the court to determine the fair value of
the shares and accrued interest."3 61 If the corporation does not do so,
it must "pay each dissenter whose demand remains unsettled the
amount demanded." 62
The proceedings are nonjury, equitable evaluation proceedings, held
"in the superior court of the county where the corporation's registered
office is located."3' However, "if the surviving corporation is a foreign
corporation without a registered office" in Georgia, the proceedings shall
be commenced in the county where the registered office of the corporation is located. 364
The corporation is required to make all dissenters whose demand
remains unsettled parties to the proceeding, whether or not they are

355.
356.
357.

Id. § 14-2-1327(a).
Id.
Id. § 14-2-1327(b).

358. Id. § 14-2-1327(c)(1).
359. Id. § 14-2-1327(c)(2).
360. Id. § 14-2-1332.

361.
362.
363.
364.

Id. § 14-2-1330(a).
Id.
Id. § 14-2-1330(b).
Id.
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residents of Georgia.3 65 This "shall have the effect of an action quasi
in rem against their shares."3" The corporation must
serve a copy of the petition in the proceeding upon each dissenting
shareholder who is a resident of [Georgia] in the manner provided by
law for the service of a summons and complaint, and upon each
nonresident dissenting shareholder either by registered or certified
mail or by publication, or in any other manner permitted by law 6 7
Section 14-2-1330(d) provides:
The jurisdiction of the court in which the proceeding is commenced...
is plenary and exclusive. The court may appoint one or more persons
as appraisers to receive evidence and recommend decision on the
question of fair value. The appraisers have the powers described in the
order appointing them or in any amendment to it.'
According to section 14-2-1330(e), "[elach dissenter made a party to
the proceeding is entitled to judgment for the amount which the court
finds to be the fair value of his shares, plus interest to the date of
judgment."3 9
The court determines all costs of the appraisal proceedings, "including
the reasonable compensation and expenses of appraisers appointed by
the court, but not including fees and expenses of attorneys and experts
for the respective parties.""' The court generally assesses the costs
against the corporation, "except that the court may assess the cost
against all or some of the dissenters, in amounts the court finds
equitable, to the extent the court finds the dissenters acted arbitrarily,
vexatiously, or not in good faith in demanding payment." 7 '
Further, "the court may also assess the fees and expenses of attorneys
and experts for the respective parties, in amounts the court finds
equitable ...

[a]gainst the corporation and in favor of any or all

dissenters if the court finds the corporation did not substantially comply
with the requirements" of Article 13, or "against either the corporation
or a dissenter, in favor of any other party, if the court finds the party
against whom fees and expenses are assessed acted arbitrarily,
vexatiously, or not in good faith."372 Section 14-2-1331(c) states:

365. Id. § 14-2-1330(c).

366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id. § 14-2-1330(d).
369. Id. § 14-2-1330(e).

370. Id. § 14-2-1331(a).
371. Id.
372. Id. § 14-2-1331(b).
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If the court finds that the services of attorneys for any dissenter were
of substantial benefit to other dissenters similarly situated, and that
the fees for those services should not be assessed against the corporation, the court may award these attorneys reasonable fees to be paid
out of the amounts awarded the dissenters who were benefited.373
Section 14-2-1332 indicates the limitations period as follows: "No
action by any dissenter to enforce dissenters' rights shall be brought
more than three years after the corporate action was taken, regardless
of whether notice of the corporate action and of the right to dissent was
given by the corporation in compliance with the [Code]." 7 4
C.

Valuation of the Shares

The method for determining fair value under the ALI Principles is
contained in section 7.22. It is the value of the shareholding "without
any discount for minority status or, absent extraordinary circumstances,
lack of marketability." 75 Subsection (a) provides that, subject to
subsections (b) and (c), the fair value is to be determined "using the
customary valuation concepts and techniques generally employed in the
relevant securities and financial markets for similar businesses in the
context of the transaction giving rise to appraisal."' 5
This flexible method of valuation reflects recent decisions rejectingthe
Delaware block method of valuation in favor of this less structured
approach.377 Comment d to section 7.22 provides:
[Section] 7.22(a) deliberately gives the court the flexible admonition
that it should look to the customary valuation standards and techniques actually employed in the relevant securities and financial
markets to value similar businesses. In a given case, customary
industry valuation standards could instruct the court as to the relative
weight to be given expected future earnings versus historical earnings,
or could indicate the appropriate price/earnings ratio to apply to
historical earnings.7 8

373. Id. § 14-2-1331(c).
374. Id. § 14-2-1332.
375. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 7.22 cmt. e provides, "the court should apply this
exception only when it finds that the dissenting shareholder has held out in order to exploit
the transaction giving rise to appraisal so as to divert value to itself that could not be made
available to other shareholders."

376. Id. § 7.22(a).
377. Most notably, by the Delaware Supreme Court in Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d
701 (Del. 1983). See ALI PRINCIPLES, IntroductoryNote to PartVII, Chapter 4, supra note

2.
378. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 7.22 cmt. d.
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The ALI also notes that often the board will be in a better position
than the court to value the shares accurately; 79 therefore, absent a
reason to suspect that the board's determination is self serving, its
valuation should be given presumptive effect.38
Section 7.22(b) provides a partial presumption in favor of the board's
judgment, when there is no obvious reason to doubt its sincerity. In the
case of business combinations not falling under sections 5.10 (transactions by a controlling shareholder with the corporation), 5.15 (transfer
of control in which a director or principal senior executive is interested),
or 7.25 (transactions involving corporate combinations to which a
majority shareholder is a party), "the aggregate price accepted by the
board of directors of the subject corporation should be presumed to
represent the fair value of the corporation, or of the assets sold in the
case of an asset sale, unless the plaintiff can prove otherwise by clear
and convincing evidence."38'
Section 7.22(c) provides that, if the transaction does fall within
sections 5.10, 5.15, or 7.25, the court should give:
substantial weight to the highest realistic price that a willing, able,
and fully informed buyer would pay for the corporation as an entirety.
In determining what such a buyer would pay, the court may include a
proportionate share of any gain reasonably to be expected to result
from the combination, unless special circumstances would make such
an allocation unreasonable, 3 2
In Georgia, flexibility is also regarded as a key to the court's task of
determining the "fair value" of the shares. "Fair value" is defined in
section 14-2-1301(5) as "the value of the shares immediately before the
effectuation of the corporate action to which the dissenter objects,
excluding any appreciation or depreciation in anticipation of the
corporate action."3 ' This contrasts with the ALI Principles which
permit the court to consider the effects of the proposed corporate action
where appropriate. 8 4 No further guidance is provided by the Georgia
Code for determining fair value, except that section 14-2-1330(d) allows
the court to appoint expert appraisers to "recommend decision on the
question of fair value."

379. See id.
380. Id. § 7.22(b).

381. Id.
382. Id. § 7.22(c).
383. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1301(5) (1994).
384. ALI PRINCIPLEs, supra note 2, § 7.22(c).
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Indeed, in Atlantic States Construction Co. v. Beavers,"' the Georgia
Court of Appeals declined to establish a set methodology for determining
fair value. Unlike the ALI Principles,which ignore minority status and
only consider lack of marketability in extraordinary circumstances, the
Georgia Court of Appeals regarded the minority status of shares and
the lack of marketability of shares in a close corporation, as relevant
considerations. However, the court, finding that the legislature clearly
intended a flexible approach to be taken to valuation, declined to
require a specific methodology.'
D. Exclusivity of the Remedy
Under the Georgia Code, the appraisal remedy is the exclusive remedy
for a shareholder entitled to it. The shareholder cannot challenge the
corporate action giving rise to the appraisal rights, except when there is
a breach by the corporation of the procedural requirements of Article 13
or of its article or bylaws, or when the vote approving the corporate
action was obtained by fraud, regardless of whether the shareholder has
exercised dissenter's rights."8 7 For this reason the shareholder must
be particularly diligent in exercising his or her dissenter's rights.
Section 7.24(a) of the ALI Principlesstates that:
An appraisal proceeding is the exclusive remedy of an eligible holder
... to challenge a transaction in control ... involving a corporate

combination that requires shareholder approval and is not subject to
[section] 5.10 (Transactions by a Controlling Shareholder with the
Corporation), [section] 5.15 (Transfer of Control in Which a Director or
Principal Senior Executive Is Interested), or [section] 7.25 (Transactions in Control Involving Corporate Combinations to Which a Majority
Shareholder is a Party) if:
(1) Disclosure concerning the transaction.., is made to the
shareholders who are entitled to authorize the transaction;
(2) The transaction is approved pursuant to, and is otherwise
in accordance with, applicable provisions of law and the corporation's charter documents... ;
(3) Eligible holders who are entitled to but do not vote to
approve the transaction are entitled to an appraisal remedy

385,
386.
387.
that the

169 Ga. App. 584, 314 S.E.2d 245 (1984).
Id. at 584, 314 S.E.2d at 245.
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1302(b). The official comment to the section provides that "the fact
merger might be argued to be unlawful as a breach of the directors' duty of care

is not ground for equitable relief at the instance of a shareholder. The dissenters' rights
remedy is the exclusive remedy unless the transaction is not in compliance with the
requirements of the Code, or the vote required to approve the action was obtained by

fraudulent and deceptive means." Id. § 14.2-1302 cmt.
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reflecting the general principles embodied in [sections] 7.22 ...
and 7.23.88

The burden is on the shareholder to prove a failure to comply with this
section. 8 9 When subsection (3) is the only subsection breached, the

cause of action is for waste of corporate assets.390 The exclusivity of
the remedy will not prevent a personal action against a director for a
breach of the duty of fair dealing.3 9 '
Section 7.24 is meant to deal with "the simple arm's-length corporate
combination to which neither a director, principal senior executive, nor
controlling shareholder is a party."92 When they are a party, the
section has no operation. 93
Under section 7.25, the appraisal remedy is the exclusive remedy to
challenge a transaction in control involving a corporate combination to
which a shareholder who has power to approve the combination is a
party only if:
(1) The directors who approve the transaction ... have an adequate
[objective] basis.., for believing that the consideration offered to the
minority shareholders in the transaction constitutes fair value for their
shares, as determined in accordance with the standards provided in
[section] 7.22...;
(2) Disclosure concerning the transaction [including the belief of the
director described in paragraph (1)] and the conflict of interest ... is
made to the minority shareholders...;
(3) The transaction is ... [legal and in accordance with the corporate
charter documents]; and
(4) Holders of equity securities who do not vote to approve the transaction are entitled to an appraisal remedy reflecting the general
principles embodied in [sections] 7.22 ... and 7.23 . . . ."
When the transaction was "authorized in advance by disinterested
directors and authorized in advance or ratified by disinterested
shareholders," following the disclosure required by paragraph (2) above,
the shareholder bears the burden of proof of a breach of the four

388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.

ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 7.24(a).
Id. § 7.24(b).
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If all but paragraph (4) is complied with, then: (1) "If the transaction
was approved by disinterested shareholders following the disclosure
required" by paragraph (2), it may be challenged as being unfair, with
the burden of proof on the minority shareholders; and (2) If it was not
so approved, it may be challenged as unfair with the burden of proof on
These exclusivity provisions do not apply
the majority shareholder.'
to closely held corporations.3 97
V.

CONCLUSION

The ALI Principlesand the Georgia Corporations Code were written
for different purposes and by different participants. The Georgia
statutory provisions are notable for their relative brevity; there is also
a relative scarcity of case law interpreting them. By contrast, the ALI
Principlesare voluminous, heavily annotated, and generously supported
with case references on a national basis; many practitioners, representatives from both management and shareholders, a veritable "who's who"
of corporate law academics, and various lobbying groups participated in
their preparation. Georgia judges and legislators have at their disposal
this vast repository of knowledge to use when further developing and
interpreting Georgia corporations law. Indeed, all judges, lawyers, and
legislators should benefit from the research, resources, balancing of
interests, and intellectual groundwork that has produced the ALI
Principlesof CorporateGovernance.

396. Id. § 7.25(c).
397. Id. § 7.25(d).

